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I. INTRODUCTION
The North Carolina Fair Sentencing Act' was the result of extensive
debate and consideration.2 It was designed as a measure to eliminate
indeterminate sentencing3 and to create uniformity in sentencing for
felons punished for similar crimes, while allowing deviation from the
legislatively-mandated presumptive sentence, based upon judicial find-
* The first look was taken in Comment, Criminal Procedure-The North Carolina Fair
Sentencing Act, 60 N.C.L. REV. 631 (1982). The author thanks Michelle Rippon and Professor
Fred Williams for their help with this Comment.
1. Codified in N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14, 15A, 18A, 20, 21, 53, 90, 105, 108, 130, 148, 163
(1983). This comment is concerned with that portion codified in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4.
2. See generally Comment, Criminal Procedure-The North Carolina Fair Sentencing Act, 60
N.C.L. REV. 631 (1982).
3. This is accomplished by taking sentence length determinations out of the hands of the
Parole Commission. See Cooke, Purpose and Theory of Presumptive Sentencing, in INSTITUTE ON
THE FAIR SENTENCING ACT I-1 (1981).
1
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ings, in those cases where aggravating and mitigating factors dictate a
different result.'
In the more than two years since the Act's effective date,5 courts and
trial attorneys have worked to implement its provision. The Act itself
provides abundant guidance as to how the legislature intended the con-
cept of fair sentencing to be implemented. For instance, the Act does
not apply to Class A or Class B felonies. It specifically makes the con-
sideration of aggravating and mitigating factors unnecessary in cases
involving plea agreements between prosecutor and defendant.6 It al-
lows a court to impose a legislatively-determined presumptive sentence
without making specific findings of aggravating and mitigating factors.7
It requires a court, however, to find by a preponderance of the evi-
dence,8 and to reduce to writing factors bearing upon sentence specifi-
cally enumerated in the Act9 and other factors relevant to the purposes
of sentencing.' 0 In order to impose a sentence of confinement in excess
of a presumptive sentence, a court must find that the aggravating fac-
tors outweigh the mitigating factors; to impose a sentence less than the
presumptive, the mitigating factors must outweigh the aggravating fac-
tors."1 Courts may not consider as evidence of an aggravating factor
evidence which established one of the essential elements of the crime
for which the defendant is being punished. l2 Nor may a court rely on
the same evidence to establish more than one aggravating factor.' 3
Despite the extensive guidance in the Act, courts and trial attorneys
have stumbled upon both procedural and substantative pitfalls in their
application of the Act's provisions. Questions have arisen concerning
the use of the same evidence to establish both an element of the crime
and an aggravating factor; use of the same evidence to establish more
than one aggravating factor; and the specific interpretation of some of
the sixteen aggravating factors,' 4 and fifteen mitigating factors' 5 in the
4. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(b) (1983). The presumptive sentences are found in N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(f) (1983).
5. July 1, 1981. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.1 (1983). The Act applies to only those felons
who commit crimes after July 1, 1981. Those felons now punished for crimes committed before
July 1, 1981 are punished under law in effect before July 1, 1981. See Comment, supra note 3, at
647.
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1340.4(a) & (b) (1983),.
7. Id § 15A-1340.4(b). State v. Bunn, 66 N.C. App. 187, 190, 310 S.E.2d 792, 795 (1984).
8. "More probably true than not." State v. Ahearn, 307 N.C. 584, 596, 300 S.E.2d 689, 697
(1983). The state bears the burden of persuasion as to aggravating factors, the defendant as to
mitigating factors. State v. Jones, 309 N.C. 214, 219, 306 S.E.2d 451, 455 (1983).
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1340.4(a)(l)a-p (1983).
10. Id § 15A-1340.4(a). The purposes of sentencing are set forth in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
1340.3 (1983).
11. Id § 15A-I340.4(b).
12. Id § 15A-1340.4(a).
13. Id
14. These problem areas have included aggravating factors dealing with: prior convictions,
2
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Act. Questions have also arisen concerning the discretion of trial
judges in weighing aggravating and mitigating factors, and the appro-
priate remedy for a trial judge's improper consideration of a factor.
This comment discusses these problem areas and the guidance which
the North Carolina appellate courts have provided to trial courts and
litigators in the interpretation of the Act. It will examine those areas
where the appellate courts have failed to provide guidance and other
problem areas.
II. USE OF EVIDENCE FOR MORE THAN ONE PURPOSE
After its listing of aggravating factors, the Act provides: "[e]vidence
necessary to prove an element of the offense may not be used to prove
any factor in aggravation, and the same item of evidence may not be
used to prove more than one factor in aggravation."' 6 These concepts
are straightforward.' 7 Nevertheless problem areas have arisen,'8 espe-
cially when the crime for which the defendant was sentenced involved
including the method of proof and the burden with respect to whether the defendant was indigent,
represented by counsel, or waived counsel at the time of the prior conviction; State v. Thompson,
309 N.C. 421, 307 S.E.2d 156 (1983); State v. Graham, 309 N.C. 587, 308 S.E.2d 311 (1983); State
v. Green, 309 N.C. 623, 308 S.E.2d 326 (1983); State v. Massey, 309 N.C. 625, 308 S.E.2d 332
(1983); and State v. Callicutt, 309 N.C. 626, 308 S.E.2d 333 (1983); especially heinous, atrocious,
or cruel crime; State v. Ahearn, 307 N.C. 584, 300 S.E.2d 689 (1983); State v. Blackwelder, 309
N.C. 410, 306 S.E.2d 783 (1983); State v. Benbow, 309 N.C. 538, 308 S.E.2d 647 (1983); pecuniary
gain; State v. Abdullah, 309 N.C. 63, 306 S.E.2d 100 (1983); State v. Jones, 309 N.C. 214, 306
S.E.2d 451 (1983); State v. Thompson, 309 N.C. 421, 307 S.E.2d 156 (1983); State v. Benbow, 309
N.C. 538, 308 S.E.2d 647 (1983); and use of a deadly weapon; State v. Chatman, 308 N.C. 169, 301
S.E.2d 71 (1983); State v. Abdullah, 309 N.C. 63, 306 S.E.2d 100 (1983).
15. Important mitigating factors construed include: voluntarily acknowledged wrongdoing;
State v. Ahearn, 307 N.C. 584, 300 S.E.2d 689 (1983); State v. Graham, 309 N.C. 587, 308 S.E.2d
311 (1983); the defendant's good character or reputation in the community; State v. Blackwelder,
309 N.C. 410, 306 S.E.2d 783 (1983); State v. Benbow, 309 N.C. 538, 308 S.E.2d 647 (1983); State
v. Taylor, 309 N.C. 570, 308 S.E.2d 302 (1983); and the defendant's mental condition or capacity
reducing his culpability for his offense; State v. Jones, 309 N.C. 214, 306 S.E.2d 451 (1983); State
v. Benbow, 309 N.C. 538, 308 S.E.2d 647 (1983); State v. Taylor, 309 N.C. 570, 308 S.E.2d 302
(1983).
16. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a)(1) (1983).
17. See, e.g., State v. Massey, 62 N.C. App. 66, 302 S.E.2d 262, modifoed and aq'd, 309 N.C.
625, 308 S.E.2d 332 (1983), a case involving both rules, wherein it was plain that the same evi-
dence was used to find aggravating factors that "[tihe defendant conspired with others to commit
the crime," and that "there was strong evidence of a conspiracy ... with others, who were sen-
tenced to life sentences for First Degree Murder [and who went to the victim's house] for the
purpose of recovering drugs and money... " Massey also held that evidence that the defendant
went to the scene of the crime with a shotgun with revenge in mind was an essential part of the
State's proof of first degree burglary. Id. at 68-69, 302 S.E.2d at 264. See also State v. Goforth, 59
N.C. App. 504, 297 S.E.2d 128 (1982) (holding in trial of attempted rape of defendant's ten-year-
old stepchild that evidence of a familial relationship was improperly used to find two aggravating
factors); State v. Thobourne, 59 N.C. App. 584, 297 S.E.2d 774 (1982) (holding that evidence used
to prove aggravating factors of pecuniary gain and an offense involving an unusually large quan-
tity of contraband was not evidence necessary to prove elements of possession with intent to sell
and deliver marijuana). But see State v. Coffey, 65 N.C. App. 751, 760, 310 S.E.2d 123, 129 (1984)
(holding that the trial court improperly found the aggravating factor of a large amount of contra-
3
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use of a deadly weapon' 9 from which the element of malice can be
inferred, ° or where the defendant pled guilty to fewer than all of the
crimes charged.
The latter circumstance occurred in the case of State v. Abee.2 ' Each
of two defendants was charged with the first degree sexual offenses of
fellatio and inserting an object into the victim's anus,2 2 and kidnap-
ping.2' Each pled guilty to second degree sexual offense based on one
act of fellatio.24 It was for that act alone, pursuant to a plea bargain,
that they were sentenced. There was evidence, however, that the ten-
year-old victim was forced to perform fellatio on each of the defend-
ants more than once, that Abee stuck his finger into the victim's anus,
and that Jones attempted to insert his penis into the victim's anus, evi-
dence which the trial court considered in aggravation. The court of
appeals held that the consideration of this evidence violated the mal-
date of the Act that the same evidence used to establish an element of
the offense not be used in aggravation, upon the theory that the evi-
dence of all these acts was necessary to establish the element of a "sex-
ual act."'25 The supreme court later modified that holding, finding that
the criminal statute defining the crime26 required only one "sexual act,"
and that the trial court properly considered the additional acts in
27
aggravation.
band when the defendant was convicted of marijuana trafficking because the amount was an ele-
ment of the offense).
18. See State v. Ahearn, 307 N.C. 584, 602, 300 S.E.2d 689, 701-02 (1983) (holding that the
trial court properly found in aggravation that the two-year-old victim was very young, when de-
fendant was convicted of felonious child abuse, which includes as an element that the victim was
less than sixteen years old; also holding that vulnerability of the victim is the essence of N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a)(l)j (1983)). See also State v. Taylor, 309 N.C. 570, 308 S.E.2d 302 (1983)
(when deadly weapon is used to commit both the homicide for which the defendant is sentenced
and another homicide, a trial court may find both the N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a)(l)i factor
of use of a deadly weapon and the non-statutory factor that "each homicide was committed during
a course of conduct in which defendant committed an act of violence against another person.")
19. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a)(l)i (1983) establishes the aggravating factor that "[tihe
defendant was armed with or used a deadly weapon at the time of the crime." This factor may not
be established when the defendant is sentenced for discharging a firearm into occupied property,
State v. Brooks, 61 N.C. App. 572, 301 S.E.2d 421 (1983); when evidence of the deadly weapon is
used to establish that the crime was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, State v. Hammonds, 61
N.C. App. 615, 301 S.E.2d 457 (1983); when the defendant is sentenced for manslaughter when a
gun is the instrument of the unlawful killing, State v. Green, 62 N.C. App. 1, 301 S.E.2d 920,
mod/iFedandaff'd, 309 N.C. 623, 308 S.E.2d 326 (1983); or when the crime is armed robbery, State
v. Morris, 59 N.C. App. 157, 296 S.E.2d 309 (1982).
20. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
21. 60 N.C. App. 99, 298 S.E.2d 184 (1982),modoiedandaf'd, 308 N.C. 379, 302 S.E.2d 230
(1983).
22. Both crimes of first degree sexual offense violated N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.4 (1978).
23. Id § 14-39.
24. Id § 14-27.5.
25. 60 N.C. App. at 103-04, 298 S.E.2d at 186.
26. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.5(a) (1978).
27. State v. Abee, 308 N.C. at 380-81, 302 S.E.2d at 231. The trial court could have consid-
4
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Trial defense attorneys should take note. Even though a defendant
may be sentenced for only the crime "of which [he] is convicted or to
which he pleads guilty or no contest,"28 evidence of other crimes, 29 or
evidence of elements of greater crimes charged but to which the de-
fendant did not plead,3" may be used in aggravation to justify a sen-
tence exceeding the presumptive. This should be a consideration in the
plea bargaining process.3'
The greatest amount of uncertainty as to the use of the same evi-
dence has arisen in cases in which the use of a deadly weapon formed
the basis of an inference of malice when malice was a necessary ele-
ment of the crime.32 The court of appeals first decided two conflicting
cases, State v. Gaynor33 and State v. Hough .3  Each of the defendants
pled guilty to second degree murder and in each case the trial court
found the aggravating factor of use of a deadly weapon. Nevertheless,
the court of appeals held that the Hough trial court finding was correct
but that the Gaynor court finding was not.
ered the additional acts either as an additional factor or as evidence that the crime was especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel. State v. Blackwelder, 309 N.C. 410, 413 n. 1, 306 S.E.2d 783, 786 n.l
(1983). See also State v. Isom, 65 N.C. App. 223, 229, 309 S.E.2d 283, 287 (1983) (evidence of
excessive bodily injury properly considered in aggravation).
28. State v. Melton, 307 N.C. 370, 374, 298 S.E.2d 673, 676 (1983).
29. State v. Green, 62 N.C. App. 1, 301 S.E.2d 920, modified and affTd, 309 N.C. 623, 308
S.E.2d 326 (1983) (holding that evidence that defendant used a deadly weapon may not be consid-
ered in aggravation for the offense of manslaughter, but evidence that defendant concealed the
weapon may be so considered because the latter act constituted a separate criminal offense under
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-269 (1978)).
30. State v. Melton, 307 N.C. at 376, 298 S.E.2d at 678 (holding that where the defendant was
properly indicted for first degree murder but pled guilty to second degree murder, the trial court
properly considered as a factor in aggravation for sentencing that the defendant had committed
the murder with premeditation and deliberation, when defendant had not bargained for a particu-
lar sentence); State v. Gaynor, 61 N.C. App. 128, 132, 300 S.E.2d 260, 262 (1983) (premeditation is
reasonably related to the purposes of sentencing in the case of second degree murder).
31. As to plea bargaining under the Fair Sentencing Act see generally Home, A Defense
Counsel's New Approach to Plea Bargaining and Extenuation & Mitigation, in INSTITUTE ON THE
NEW FAIR SENTENCING ACT VI-I (1981). See also State v. Melton, 307 N.C. at 376-77, 298
S.E.2d at 678, where the court noted that the defendant had passed up his opportunity to bargain
for a recommendation of sentence from the prosecutor while upholding the trial court's discretion
to sentence, in effect, for the crime of first degree murder, of which the defendant was indicted,
when he pled guilty to second degree murder.
32. See State v. Reynolds, 307 N.C. 184, 297 S.E.2d 532 (1982) as to the propriety of the
inference. All of the cases where the defendant has been sentenced under the Fair Sentencing Act
have involved the crime of second degree murder, which includes malice as one of its essential
elements. State v. Hutchins, 303 N.C. 321, 279 S.E.2d 788 (1981). Of course the crime of first
degree murder requires the element of malice aforethought, but defendants sentenced for that
crime are sentenced under the provisions of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (1983). The capital act
contains a provision similar to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a)(l)i. It provides for the aggravat-
ing factor that "[tihe defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person
by means of a weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one
person." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(10) (1983).
33. 61 N.C. App. 128, 300 S.E.2d 260 (1983).
34. 61 N.C. App. 132, 300 S.E.2d 409, disc. rev. denied, 308 N.C. 193, 302 S.E.2d 246 (1983).
5
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The facts of the two cases are similar. Each of the defendants inten-
tionally used a deadly weapon, Gaynor a .22 calibre rifle and Hough a
.22 calibre revolver, to kill another person, Gaynor her mother with
whom she was living at the time of the murder, and Hough a man with
whom he lived. Gaynor testified that she did not get along with her
mother. Evidence showed that Hough had been ordered to move out
of his victim's home. Gaynor had hidden the murder weapon a couple
weeks before she killed her mother with one shot. Hough shot his vic-
tim four times.
The number of shots and the manner of killing seem to have made
the difference.35 In Gaynor the court held that the intentional use of the
weapon was necessary to prove the element of malice; in Hough it was
held not necessary. Nevertheless, the court in Hough did not rely
solely on the number of shots and manner of killing. "Notwithstanding
the lack of evidence of ill will, hatred or spite or the lack of presump-
tive malice arising from the use of a deadly weapon, malice existed as a
matter of law from the evidence presented that defendant, without excuse
or mitigating circumstances, unlawfully and intentionally shot the de-
ceased."36 If that is so, the question arises why the use of the weapon
was necessary to prove malice in Gaynor, thus preventing evidence of
use of a deadly weapon as an aggravating factor.
Two weeks later the court followed Gaynor in State v. Keaton.7
Keaton intentionally used a weapon to kill his victim, shooting him
three times. The court said: "[als there were no facts and circum-
stances indicating that Hawks' death was unusually gruesome other
than the fact that he died from gunshot wounds, the necessary element
of malice must have been inferred by the jury from the evidence that
defendant intentionally shot Hawks with a gun."38 The court of ap-
peals apparently has more insight into the workings of juries than most
of us.
The supreme court noted the problem of second guessing juries when
it made a definitive rule in State v. Blackwelder39 for similar cases.
Blackwelder shot his victim twice in the head, literally blowing out his
brains. The trial court instructed the jury on the inference of malice
which they could draw from the use of the deadly weapon. The
supreme court held that "when, as in the case sub judice, the facts jus-
tify an instruction on the inference of malice arising as a matter of law
from the use of a deadly weapon, evidence of the use of that deadly
35. Id at 134, 300 S.E.2d at 411.
36. Id (emphasis added).
37. 61 N.C. App. 279, 283-84, 300 S.E.2d 471, 473 (1983).
38. Id
39. 309 N.C. 410, 306 S.E.2d 783 (1983).
6
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weapon may not be used as an aggravating factor at sentencing."4
The court further stated in dictum that this rule applies whether the
instruction was actually given, or in the case of a guilty plea, could
have been given.4  The court later so held in State v. Taylor. 2
This holding will impact upon trial courts and litigators. It places
greater importance upon whether the trial court instructs on the pre-
sumption of malice. Prosecutors may not want to move as vigorously
for the instruction on presumed malice in hope of the trial court finding
in aggravation that the defendant used a deadly weapon. The impact is
greater, however, in the larger number of cases involving guilty pleas.
In these cases, defense counsel may raise the issue anticipating that the
trial court will find, as a matter of law, that the instruction would be
justified on the facts, a finding not likely to be disturbed on appeal.
Trial courts finding the use of a deadly weapon as an aggravating fac-
tor when the defendant has pled guilty to second degree murder or
other similar crimes, will better preserve the record if they also specifi-
cally find, as a matter of law, that the facts of the case would not justify
an instruction on the inference of malice.
Despite the "bright-line" rule of Blackwelder, the issue raised in
Hough43 remains. Does malice exist as a matter of law when evidence
shows that the "defendant, without excuse or mitigating circumstances,
unlawfully and intentionally shot the deceased"? The supreme court
has consistently held that it does." Arguably then, the Blackwelder rule
prevents a trial court's finding of the aggravating factor of use of a
deadly weapon in any case of second degree murder involving the use
of a deadly weapon because the facts, as a matter of law, always justify
axn instruction on the malice that may be inferred. Courts should be
reluctant to find the aggravating factor in such a second degree murder
case.
45
III. SPECIFIC AGGRAVATING FACTORS
Most of the sixteen aggravating factors listed in the Act may be con-
strued by considering their plain meaning. 46 A few, particularly those
40. Id. at 417, 306 S.E.2d at 788.
41. 1d
42. 309 N.C. 570, 573, 308 S.E.2d 302, 305 (1983).
43. See supra text accompanying note 36.
44. State v. Jenkins, 300 N.C. 578, 268 S.E.2d 458 (1980); State v. Potter, 295 N.C. 126, 244
S.E.2d 397 (1978); State v. Patterson, 288 N.C. 553, 559, 220 S.E.2d 600, 606 (1975), death penalty
vacated, 428 U.S. 904 (1976); State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 198, 166 S.E.2d 652 (1969); State v. Bald-
win, 152 N.C. 822, 829, 68 S.E. 148, 151 (1910).
45. The supreme court has had occasion to apply the Blackwelder rule in a case of second
degree murder. State v. Taylor, 309 N.C. 570, 308 S.E.2d 302 (1983).
46. E.g. that "the defendant involved a person under the age of 16 in the commission of the
crime." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a)(l)l (1983).
7
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dealing with prior convictions,47 especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel
crimes, 48 and pecuniary gain 49 have provided problems of interpreta-
tion. This comment will discuss how the appellate courts have inter-
preted these and other specific aggravating factors.
A. Prior Convictions and Their Proof
Perhaps the most important aggravating factor and the one which
any prosecutor can always use to his advantage is the one providing for
consideration of the defendant's prior criminal record. 0 The law is
well-established in allowing the State to use prior convictions to justify
increased punishment for the recidivist.5 '
1. Methods of Proof
The problems arise in the interpretation of the provisions of the Act
which provide for the method of proving the defendant's prior
conviction.
A prior conviction may be proved by stipulation of the parties or by
the original or a certified copy of the court record of the prior convic-
tion. The original or certified copy of the court record, bearing the
same name as that by which the defendant is charged, shall be prima
facie evidence that the defendant named therein is the same as the de-
fendant before the court, and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts
set out therein. No prior conviction which occurred while the defend-
ant was indigent may be considered in sentencing unless the defendant
was represented by counsel or waived counsel with respect to that prior
conviction. A defendant may make a motion to suppress evidence of a
prior conviction pursuant to G.S. 15A-980. If the motion is made for
the first time during the sentencing stage of the criminal action, either
47. Id § 15A-1340.4(a)(I)o.
48. Id § 15A-1340.4(a)(l)f.
49. Id § 15A-1340.4(a)(l)c.
50. Id § 15A-1340.4(a)(l)o, which provides that a trial court may consider in aggravation
that
[tihe defendant has a prior conviction or convictions for criminal offenses punishable by more
than 60 days' confinement. Such convictions include those occurring in North Carolina
courts and courts of other states, the District of Columbia, and the United States, provided
that any crime for which the defendant was convicted in a jurisdiction other than North
Carolina would have been a crime if committed in this State. Such prior convictions do not
include any crime that is joinable, under G.S. Chapter 15A, with the crime or crimes for
which the defendant is currently being sentenced.
No appellate court has considered the issue whether the crime for which the defendant was con-
victed in a court other than a North Carolina court is also a crime in North Carolina. The prior
conviction or convictions do not have to be related to the crime for which the defendant is being
sentenced, State v. Hough, 61 N.C. App. 132, 135, 300 S.E.2d 409, 411-12 (1983). A trial court
must consider prior convictions, State v. Teague, 60 N.C. App. 755, 758, 300 S.E.2d 7, 9 (1983).
51. State v. Hester, 37 N.C. App. 448, 451, 246 S.E.2d 83, 85 (1978); State v. Thompson, 267
N.C. 653, 655, 148 S.E.2d 613, 615 (1966) (per curiam); State v. Cooper, 238 N.C. 241, 244, 77
S.E.2d 695, 698 (1953).
8
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the State or the defendant is entitled to a continuance of the sentencing
hearing.
52
The first sentence of this subsection provides two ways the State may
prove a defendant's prior criminal record, stipulation or certified copy
of a court record. The question arises whether a prosecutor is limited
to those two methods of proof. The court of appeals5 3 and the supreme
court5 4 both have found that the legislature's use of the word "may"
means that the statute allows methods of proof other than these two.5 5
This interpretation allows district attorneys to use the convenient
method of proving a defendant's prior criminal record with Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) records.5 6
The supreme court approved an additional method of proof in State
v. Thompson5 7 while disapproving of another. The court allowed the
use of testimony elicited from the defendant on cross-examination dur-
ing the guilt/innocence phase of the trial concerning his prior criminal
convictions. The court opined, however, that the trial court should not
have considered as evidence of conviction a statement made by the
prosecutor that he remembered that the defendant had been previously
convicted in another county.5 8
Since the rules of evidence are generally not applicable to sentencing
hearings,59 the court of appeals has approved, in State v. Graham6" the
use of hearsay evidence, otherwise inadmissible, to prove the defend-
52. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(e) (1983).
53. State v. Massey, 59 N.C. App. 704, 705, 298 S.E.2d 63, 64-65 (1982), modified and ajfd,
309 N.C. 625, 308 S.E.2d 332 (1983). Massey failed to object at trial to the introduction into
evidence of the record of his prior criminal convictions, and the appeals court held that he could
therefore not complain on appeal of its admission at trial. Nevertheless, the court went on to
interpret the statutory language as permissive and not mandatory. Id
54. State v. Thompson, 309 N.C. 421, 307 S.E.2d 156 (1983).
55. See also State v. McDougall, 308 N.C. 1, 301 S.E.2d 308 (1983) and State v. Taylor. 304
N.C. 249, 283 S.E.2d 761 (1981), which interpret the capital punishment statute similarly.
56. See State v. Edwards, 49 N.C. App. 547, 556, 272 S.E.2d 384, 391 (1980) (approving the
admission at a sentencing hearing of a FBI record of the defendant's prior crimes); State v. Smith,
300 N.C. 71, 81-82, 265 S.E.2d 164, 171 (1980), (approving the admission into evidence of a FBI
fingerprint study indicating that the defendant had a prior criminal conviction). See also State v.
Massey, 59 N.C. App. 704, 298 S.E.2d 63 (1982), and State v. Bynum, 65 N.C. App. 813, 310
S.E.2d 388 (1984), cases decided after the 1 July 1981 effective date of the Act.
57. 309 N.C. 421, 307 S.E.2d 156 (1983).
58. The defendant, charged with the crimes of felonious breaking or entering and felonious
larceny, admitted to previous convictions for forgery and driving under the influence. The district
attorney's trial folder indicated to him that the defendant also had a prior conviction for larceny,
and because he had no other record of the conviction, the district attorney relied on his memory.
Statements by defendants' counsel are a different matter. They may be construed as a stipula-
tion or otherwise as sufficient evidence of a prior conviction. See State v. Cook, 65 N.C. App. 703,
309 S.E.2d 737 (1983).
59. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1334(b) (1983); State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 265 S.E.2d 164
(1980); State v. Jackson, 302 N.C. 101, 273 S.E.2d 666 (1981).
60. 61 N.C. App. 271, 274, 300 S.E.2d 716, 718,modoiedandaffd, 309 N.C. 587, 308 S.E.2d
311 (1983).
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ant's prior criminal record. In Graham a deputy sheriff testified about
what other people had told him concerning the defendant's criminal
record; he did not testify with any reference to or use of court records.
State v. Smith6 would have been helpful precedent in Graham on the
issue of hearsay evidence. In Smith the court found proper the trial
court's admission into evidence of a FBI fingerprint study which indi-
cated that the defendant had a prior criminal conviction. The trial
court had found that the evidence was reliable hearsay. The evidence
of the deputy sheriff in Graham was not as reliable as the FBI finger-
print study in Smith. The deputy sheriff in Graham repeated out-of-
court statements made to him. The notation on the FBI fingerprint
study in Smith was the result of an administrative practice regularly
performed by the same agency which maintains criminal records.
Proof of a defendant's prior criminal record for the purpose of estab-
lishing an aggravating factor in order to raise the defendant's sentence
above the presumptive should be based on reliable evidence, even if the
rules of evidence are relaxed at the sentencing hearings. It is not too
great a burden on the State to produce court records to establish this
aggravating factor even if other acceptable methods of proof are not
available. Reliance on out-of-court statements related by police of-
ficers should be avoided, especially in light of most courts' inclination
to find such witnesses credible.
In Graham the supreme court did not reach the question whether the
deputy's testimony alone would have been sufficient to prove the prior
convictions. While characterizing the deputy's testimony as hearsay,
the court held that the defendant's admission of the prior convictions
while a witness not only cured any defect caused by the deputy's hear-
say evidence but also alone constituted a proper means of proof.62
Methods of proof other than use of court records or stipulation of the
parties sometimes create problems, when more than one conviction is
at issue, concerning which conviction or convictions the trial judge has
found as an aggravating factor. The supreme court has asked that trial
courts indicate which convictions they have found in order to facilitate
appellate review.63
2. Burden of Proof as to Constitutionality
The legislature was no doubt mindful of the mandate of United
States v. Tucker64 when it drafted the portion of the Act requiring,
before a record of conviction may be used to establish a factor in aggra-
61. 300 N.C. 71, 81-82, 265 S.E.2d 164, 171 (1980).
62. State v. Graham, 309 N.C. 587, 593, 308 S.E.2d 311, 316 (1983).
63. State v. Thompson, 309 N.C. 421, 425 n.2, 307 S.E.2d 156, 159 n.2 (1983).
64. 404 U.S. 443 (1972).
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vation, a showing that the defendant was not indigent, was represented
by counsel, or waived counsel rights at the time of the prior conviction.
The provision is designed to prevent the use of a constitutionally infirm
conviction as a means of imprisoning the defendant beyond the pre-
sumptive sentence. This provision, however, has been subject to differ-
ing interpretations. The question asked, and now answered, is whether
the legislature intended the burden on the issue of the defendant's indi-
gency, representation, or waiver of representation at the prior proceed-
ing to be upon the State or the defendant.
The court of appeals first intimated, in an opinion filed in December,
1982, that the provision placed the onus upon the defendant to move to
exclude a record of prior conviction because of its constitutional infir-
mity.65 In February, 1983, in State v. Farmer6 6 the court of appeals
made clear that the provision required a finding by the trial court con-
cerning the representation of the defendant at the prior proceeding
from which the conviction resulted. Unfortunately, the court did not
address the question of the burden of proof. The court implied that the
burden was on the State, but did not expressly say so.
However, in State v. Thompson67 decided the same day as Farmer
Judge Webb wrote for the court:
We do not believe the burden should be on the defendant to prove he
was indigent and did not have counsel or waived counsel. The statute
provides for a presumptive sentence unless the aggravating factors out-
weigh the mitigating factors. The burden should be on the State to
prove the aggravating factors if the presumptive sentence is not to be
imposed.68
The court of appeals thereafter invoked the Thompson precedent when
the State, dissatisfied with the need to prove the constitutionality of a
defendant's conviction, again argued cases69 before that court.
Advocates for the State argued that the requirement of proving the
defendant was not indigent, was represented by counsel, or waived
counsel was unjustified for a number of reasons. First, they pointed to
the language of the statute providing that the defendant may move to
suppress the evidence. This language, they argued, showed that the
legislature intended for the burden to be on the defendant. Secondly,
they contended that the burden on the State to in effect show the consti-
tutionality of the prior conviction required a retrial of the prior case,
65. State v. Massey, 59 N.C. App. 704, 705, 298 S.E.2d 63, 65 (1982).
66. 60 N.C. App. 779, 299 S.E.2d 842 (1983).
67. 60 N.C. App. 679, 300 S.E.2d 29 (1983).
68. Id at 685, 300 S.E.2d at 33.
69. State v. Locklear, 61 N.C. App. 594, 301 S.E.2d 437, disc. rev. denied, 308 N.C. 679, 304
S.E.2d 759 (1983); State v. Green, 62 N.C. App. 1, 301 S.E.2d 920, modfled and affd, 309 N.C.
623, 308 S.E.2d 326 (1983); State v. Callicutt, 62 N.C. App. 296, 302 S.E.2d 460, rev'd and re-
manded, 309 N.C. 626, 308 S.E.2d 333 (1983).
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and raised other issues such as whether the defendant had received the
effective assistance of counsel. Instead, State's attorneys wanted to rely
on the presumed validity of prior judgments.7" Their argument was
well taken that the burden should be on the defendant because the
knowledge of whether he was indigent, represented by counsel, or
waived counsel is a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of any de-
fendant. State's advocates did not want the burden of searching
through court records in multiple jurisdictions in order to meet their
burden. Lastly, they argued that the burden was a matter for legislative
determination.
Though the court of appeals adhered to the Thompson holding, the
arguments of the State were not unheard.7' Of particular importance is
the legislative reaction, codified in a bill ratified on June 13, 1983, and
effective October 1, 1983.72 The bill deleted from paragraph (e) of the
Act the words "pursuant to Article 53 of this Chapter," and substituted
the words "pursuant to G.S.15A-980," a new statutory provision indi-
cating the legislature's intent to place the burden on the defendant dur-
ing a sentencing hearing.73
At the time of the bill's ratification the supreme court had not de-
cided those cases tried under the old language of the Act concerning
the burden of proof. In an opinion filed just prior to the October 1,
1983 effective date of the new Act, the court modified the Thompson
holding and placed the burden on the defendant.74 The court gave trial
courts and counsel guidance concerning how to proceed.
If the defendant elects to challenge the admissibility of his prior con-
victions, he must do so by a method which informs the court of the
specific reason for his objection, i.e., that he was indigent and unrepre-
sented by counsel at the time of the prior conviction or convictions. A
mere objection to the evidence alone will not be sufficient. The defend-
ant may challenge the evidence of prior convictions prior to trial by
motion to suppress or he may challenge the evidence in the first in-
stance at the time of the offer of proof by the State. The challenge may
be in the form of objection, motion to strike, motion to suppress or
other acceptable means. The onus is on the defendant to inform the
court that he is prepared on voir dire to offer proof that he was indigent
and unrepresented by counsel at the time of the prior convictions.
70. State v. Pope, 257 N.C. 326, 126 S.E.2d 126 (1962).
71. See, e.g., State v. Green, 62 N.C. App. at 5, 301 S.E.2d at 922-23 n.I, wherein Judge
Wichard, the author of the Massey opinion, noted that he was reluctantly applying the Thompson
precedent and explained why he thought the burden should be on defendants.
72. An Act to Set Forth the Procedure to Suppress a Prior Conviction Obtained in Violation
of the Right to Counsel, Ch. 513, 1983 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 172.
73. Under the provisions of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-980 (1983), the defendant would have to
make a formal motion, supported by affidavit, prior to trial.
74. State v. Thompson, 309 N.C. 421, 307 S.E.2d 156 (1983).
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If the defendant challenges the evidence by motion to suppress, the
proceedings on the motion are governed by Article 53 of Chapter 15A
of the General Statutes. When the challenge is made otherwise than by
a motion to suppress, the defendant has the burden of going forward
with the evidence of his indigency and lack of representation, or waiver
thereof, on his prior convictions. If the defendant establishes a prima
facie showing, the burden shifts to the State to prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the challenged evidence is admissible.
7 5
This rule makes the procedure plain. The burden of raising the issue
is always on the defendant. He may choose to make a motion to sup-
press before trial. Of course defendant's counsel may make such a mo-
tion only if he knows about the defendant's conviction record. While it
is now almost imperative that defense counsel inquire of their clients
concerning matters in aggravation and mitigation,76 including prior
convictions, some clients will continue to keep information about prior
convictions from their counsel. Defense counsel will know about the
prior convictions if they make a discovery request pursuant to N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 15A-903(c) or if diligent State attorneys inform them in
time to allow appropriate pre-trial motions.77 At least one trial court
judge has recommended the latter procedure.78 It is an advisable pro-
cedure in light of the provision, still in the Act and unaffected by the
October 1, 1983 amendment, that either the State or the defendant may
be entitled to a continuance if a motion to suppress is made for the first
time during the sentencing hearing.
If a motion to suppress is not made prior to trial, for whatever rea-
son, the defendant may challenge the use of his conviction by way of
objection or motion to strike at the time the State offers the evidence.
Just as the burden of going forward is on the defendant who makes a
motion to suppress prior to trial,7 9 the burden is likewise on the defend-
ant who objects or moves to strike. The burden of persuasion, by a
preponderance of the evidence, remains with the State.
This is a satisfactory solution to the problem. In order to move to
suppress the evidence of conviction before trial, defendants are re-
quired to submit an affidavit in support of the motion.8° This affidavit
will most likely be that of the defendant, but this does not raise signifi-
75. Id at 428, 307 S.E.2d at 161.
76. See Home, supra note 31.
77. State attorneys should do this even though they do not have a general duty to disclose
information in their possession to the defendant. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977)
(holding that the State need not reveal before trial the names of all witnesses who will testify
against the defendant).
78. Snepp, Changes Required ofand by the Trial Bench Under the New Act, INSTITUTE ON
THE NEW FAIR SENTENCING ACT IV-4 (1981).
79. See State v. Gibson, 32 N.C. App. 584, 233 S.E.2d 84 (1977).
80. At least as to Superior Court practice. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-977 (1983).
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cant self-incrimination problems.8 Counsel for defendants may not
wish to move for suppression prior to trial in hope that the prosecution
is unaware of the conviction. If the prosecutor attempts to elicit evi-
dence of the conviction through cross-examination 82 of the defendant,
as a witness during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial, defense coun-
sel may at that time object or make a motion to strike, so long as he is
prepared to make an offer of proof that the defendant was previously
indigent and unrepresented. This requirement is helpful to defense
counsel when deciding whether clients should testify.83 A defender
knows, if he has evidence of the defendant's indigency or lack of repre-
sentation at the prior proceeding, that he may offer it and shift the bur-
den to the State to show that the conviction may properly be used for
sentencing purposes. It is unlikely that the State will readily have evi-
dence showing that the defendant was not previously indigent, was rep-
resented by counsel, or waived his counsel rights.84
The question arises how the Thompson procedure will affect, if at all,
the admissibility of evidence of prior convictions elicited from the de-
fendant in cross-examination for the purpose of impeachment. There
is no general requirement that the prosecutor, before questioning a de-
fendant as a witness, show that the prior conviction or convictions were
constitutionally obtained,85 but only that the prosecutor have a good
faith basis for asking the defendant, while on the witness stand, about
his criminal record.86 Thompson requires the defendant to object at the
time of the State's offer of proof. It is clear that evidence elicited dur-
ing the guilt/innocence phase of the trial may be considered by the
court to establish aggravating and mitigating factors for sentencing.87
81. State v. Gibson, 32 N.C. App. 584, 233 S.E.2d 84 (1977).
82. See supra notes 57 & 62 and accompanying text.
83. In State v. Thompson the defendant testified during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial,
and it was while the defendant was testifying upon cross-examination that the district attorney
elicited testimony concerning the defendant's prior convictions.
84. District attorneys could ensure the availability of such evidence by requiring the annota-
tion on court records, after each conviction, of the fact that the defendant was represented at trial
or waived counsel. With respect to waiver, the State may rely on evidence that the defendant, at
either the preliminary hearing or first appearance of the prior proceeding, waived his right to
counsel.
85. But see State v. Mayhand, 298 N.C. 418, 427, 259 S.E.2d 231, 238 (1979) (trial judge
allowed district attorney to question the defendant about only those prior convictions at the time
of which the defendant was represented by counsel); State v. Vincent, 35 N.C. App. 369, 373, 241
S.E.2d 390, 393 (1978) (trial court erred in permitting cross-examination of the defendant concern-
ing his prior conviction after the defendant had shown that he was indigent and unrepresented at
the prior proceeding).
86. State v. Pilkington, 302 N.C. 505, 510, 276 S.E.2d 389, 393, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 850
(1981).
87. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1444(al) (1983); State v. Teague, 60 N.C. App. 755, 300
S.E.2d 7 (1983). But see State v. Benbow, 309 N.C. 538, 308 S.E.2d 647 (1983) (it is improper for a
trial court to rely on evidence from the trial of others convicted of the same crime because of the
need to sentence a defendant upon only his individual culpability).
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It is likely, then, that the State will elicit evidence of the prior convic-
tion or convictions only once during cross-examination of the defend-
ant while he is testifying during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial.
If defense counsel successfully objects to the introduction of the evi-
dence on the ground that the defendant was indigent and unrepre-
sented at the time of the prior conviction or convictions, the court
should not receive the evidence for the purpose of impeaching the de-
fendant as a witness.88 Neither should the court receive the evidence
for the purpose of establishing the aggravating factor of prior convic-
tions, if the defendant is found guilty.
The legislature, like the supreme court, has expressed its opinion
about the suppression of constitutionally infirm prior convictions.
First, paragraph (a) of the new General Statute § 15A-980 allows a de-
fendant to suppress a constitutionally infirm conviction if the State's
use of it will be for purposes of impeachment or sentencing.89 This
provision solves the problem of when defense counsel should object on
the ground of indigency and non-representation when the State elicits
evidence of prior conviction from the defendant upon cross-examina-
tion. Under the statutory provision, it is clear that the defendant may
object to the introduction into evidence of the conviction for the pur-
pose of preventing its use both for impeachment and to establish the
prior conviction aggravating factor. Secondly, the Act provides only
one method of challenging the State's use of a prior conviction. The
defendant must move to suppress the evidence before trial, and if he
does not he waives his right to suppress.9° Thirdly, the Act places the
burden on the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
not only that he was indigent and had no counsel but also that he did
not waive his right to counsel at the prior proceeding.9
It is noteworthy that the supreme court was aware of the Act when it
reached its decision in Thompson, which was decided just prior to the
Act's effective date.9" This fact gives rise to some reasonable inferences
from a comparison of the Act's procedure and the Thompson
procedure.
The clear intent of paragraph (b) of the Act is to provide only one
method by which a defendant may "suppress" the use of a prior con-
88. See State v. Mayhand, 298 N.C. at 427, 259 S.E.2d at 238, and cases cited therein. While
North Carolina courts have consistently held that a defendant's due process rights are not violated
when he is impeached as a witness upon cross-examination by the use of a prior conviction, at
least one court has held to the contrary. State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii, 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971).
89. Paragraph (a) also allows suppression of evidence of prior convictions if used to "increase
the degree of crime of which the defendant would be guilty;" or would "result in a sentence of
imprisonment that otherwise would not be imposed;" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-980(a) (1983).
90. Id. § 15A-980(b).
91. Id. § 15A-980(c).
92. 309 N.C. at 425, 307 S.E.2d at 160.
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viction. Assuming that the legislature's intent was not to include within
the meaning of "suppress" an objection or motion to strike, the
supreme court nevertheless provided for the latter two means to "sup-
press" a prior conviction. The court chose to ignore the legislature's
intent to establish only one "suppression" procedure when it held that
"the challenge [of a prior conviction or convictions] may be in the form
of objection, motion to strike, motion to suppress or other acceptable
means." The Act's drafters seem to have assumed that prosecutors
would provide to defense counsel evidence of the defendant's criminal
record in so timely a fashion that defense counsel would move to sup-
press prior to trial,94 but they did not require prosecutors to do so. The
court's Thompson procedure, on the other hand, provides for the possi-
bility that neither party may know about the defendant's criminal rec-
ord before trial. It allows the State to elicit evidence from the
defendant on cross-examination if the State's attorney has learned of a
conviction or convictions since the beginning of trial, and allows de-
fense counsel to challenge the use of the evidence if he learns about it
for the first time during trial. The Thompson procedure requires de-
fense counsel to make an offer of proof as to the defendant's indigency
and lack of representation at the former proceeding. In the typical
case, however, where the proof will come from the defendant's testi-
mony, defense counsel need do no more than ask for a recess to prepare
the evidence.
It is much clearer that the court chose to ignore the legislative plac-
ing of the burden of proof entirely upon the defendant. Under Thomp-
son the burden of persuasion remains with the State to show the
evidence is admissible, but arises only after the defendant has made a
prima facie showing. This procedure is in sharp contrast to that estab-
lished by the Act, which places the burden of persuasion entirely on the
defendant. The State has no burden at all under the Act. The-defend-
ant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that at the time of
the prior proceeding he (1) was indigent, (2) had no counsel, and
(3) did not waive his right to counsel.
The Act raises serious due process questions by placing the burden of
persuasion on the defendant. The Act's provisions are in conflict with
the general mandate of Mullaney v. Wilbut 95 that the burden of persua-
93. Id 427-28, 307 S.E.2d at 161 (emphasis added).
94. Prosecutors are not required to disclose to defense counsel evidence of the defendant's
prior convictions which they have in their possession unless the defendant has made a motion for
discovery pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(c) (1983). See supra note 77.
95. 421 U.S. 684 (1975). The State of Maine required the defendant, in order not to be
convicted of homicide, to prove that he acted in the heat of passion. The Court held that this
requirement violated due process in light of the requirement that the State prove every element of
a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The State must prove absence of heat of passion beyond a
reasonable doubt.
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sion remain with the State in criminal cases. The North Carolina
Supreme Court has recognized and applied this principle.96 That the
court was cognizant of the due process considerations in the distribu-
tion of burdens of proof is evidenced by the court's citation, in Thomp-
son, 9 7 of two recent cases which hold that the burden of proving
admissibility of evidence remains with the State.98 It appears as though
the North Carolina court had good reason to ignore the decision of the
legislature, soon to become effective, to place the burden of proof en-
tirely on the defendant.
Trial courts now face a dilemma in certain situations. They can
choose to follow the Act and allow suppression only before trial or they
may follow the Thompson procedure. The supreme court has already
held in Thompson that a defendant may challenge a prior conviction or
convictions at the sentencing hearing in more ways than just a suppres-
sion motion. The court is likely to hold to that precedent in light of the
practical problems already discussed. The court may interpret "sup-
press" as used in the language of the new statute to not include objec-
tions or motions to strike. Then a defendant's waiver of his right to
suppress by failure to make a pre-trial motion will not deny him of his
right to object, move to strike, or use other acceptable means. This is a
reasonable interpretation in light of the provision of G.S. § 15A-
1340.4(e) contemplating a motion "made for the first time during the
sentencing stage of the criminal action." The court can not as easily get
around the due process problem. It appears as though the court, at the
time of the Thompson decision, was cognizant of the problems the new
provisions would create, and thus set a precedent for courts to follow.
The court is likely to follow its own precedent rather than the Act's
procedure. Trial courts should follow the court and not the legislature.
B. Especially Heinous, Atrocious, or Cruel Crime
Trial courts and litigators who have worked with the Capital Sen-
tencing statute99 are familiar with the language of the Fair Sentencing
96. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 288 N.C. 680, 220 S.E.2d 558 (1975) (an evidentiary presump-
tion that a killing is unlawful and done with malice when intentionally committed with a deadly
weapon shifts the burden of going forward to the defendant but does not shift the burden of
persuasion from the State).
97. 309 N.C. at 428, 307 S.E.2d at 161.
98. State v. Breeden, 306 N.C. 533, 293 S.E.2d 788 (1982) (defendant's compliance with the
affidavit requirement of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-977, pursuant to a motion to suppress an in-court
identification, satisfied the burden of going forward so as to shift the burden of proof to the State);
State v. Cheek, 307 N.C. 552, 299 S.E.2d 633 (1983) (denial of motion to suppress defendant's
inculpatory statement to the police proper when the trial court placed the burden of production on
the defendant but also left the burden of proof with the State).
99. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (1983).
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Act factor"° dealing with especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel crime.
Since it is appropriate to look to the application of the capital statute's
provisions for definitional purposes, 0 ' courts and trial attorneys have
had some idea about the definition of this factor. In applying the lan-
guage of the capital statute, the supreme court has relied on an inter-
pretation best expressed in State v. Pinch. °2
[The] aggravating circumstance of G.S. 15A-2000(e)(9) "does not
arise in cases in which death was immediate and in which there was no
unusual infliction of suffering upon the victim." . . . Instead ... the
submission of G.S. 15-2000(e)(9) is appropriate only when there is evi-
dence of excessive brutality, beyond that normally present in any kill-
ing, or when the facts as a whole portray the commission of a crime
which was conscienceless, pitiless or unnecessarily tortuous to the
victim.' 
0 3
This definition becomes especially instructive in non-capital homicide
cases.
It is apparent that this factor is really one factor with three prongs, as
indicated by the legislature's use of the disjunctive "or" in the statute's
provision providing for this factor. "o In one of its first cases interpret-
ing this factor, the court of appeals held that the trial court had improp-
erly found only that the crime was atrocious.' °5 The trial court's error,
however, was not in finding simply that the crime was atrocious, but in
100. Id § 15A-1340.4(a)(1)f (1983) provides as an aggravating factor that "The offense was
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel," while N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(9) (1983) provides
that "the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel."
101. State v. Ahearn, 307 N.C. 584, 599, 300 S.E.2d 689, 698 (1983); State v. Blackwelder, 309
N.C. 410, 413, 306 S.E.2d 783, 786 (1983).
102. 306 N.C. 1, 292 S.E.2d 203 (1982).
103. 306 N.C. at 34, 292 S.E.2d at 227-28. It is instructive to see how far the court has
stretched this definition to uphold a finding that a crime is especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
In State v. Oliver, 309 N.C. 326, 307 S.E.2d 304 (1983), death was immediate, there was no unu-
sual infliction of suffering, nor was there any torture of either of two victims. Yet as to one victim,
an attendant in a convenience store, the court upheld the trial court's finding of this aggravating
factor upon evidence, elicited from a fellow prisoner of one of the defendants, that the victim
begged for his life seconds before the defendant shot him. The court relied on a new expanded
definition of the factor which allows consideration of all the circumstances of the crime. In the
context of the Fair Sentencing Act, this expanded definition potentially conflicts with the require-
ment that evidence used to prove an element of the offense may not be used to prove an aggravat-
ing factor. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a)(I) (1983). See State v. Abee, 60 N.C. App. 99, 298
S.E.2d 184 (1982), modifoedandaft'd, 308 N.C. 379, 302 S.E.2d 230 (1983). The capital sentencing
act does not contain an express provision against use of the same evidence to establish both an
element of a crime and an aggravating factor. But see State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86, 113, 257
S.E.2d 551, 567-68 (1979) (holding that the underlying felony of a felony murder may not be used
as evidence in aggravation).
104. The instruction given to juries in capital cases defines each of the terms. "In this context
heinous means extremely wicked or shockingly evil; atrocious means outrageously wicked and
vile; and cruel means designed to inflict a high degree of pain with utter indifference to, or even
enjoyment of, the suffering of others." North Carolina Pattern Jury Instruction for Criminal
Cases, § 150.10 (Replacement May 1980).
105. State v. Goforth, 59 N.C. App. 504, 297 S.E.2d 128 (1982).
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using the same evidence to establish that aggravating factor along with
another.'06 Despite this implicit approval of the idea that a trial court
may find that the crime was either heinous, atrocious, or cruel, most
trial courts find that the crime was "especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel."'0 7 The supreme court has asked trial courts to indicate which
specific adjective they have found applicable to the crime. 1 8 Such a
requirement causes trial courts to be more specific about what evidence
they have relied on to find this aggravating factor. In light of the diffi-
culty courts have encountered in defining this factor, 0 9 such a require-
ment facilitates consideration of this factor both at trial and in the
appellate courts. Unfortunately, few courts fulfill the requirement
when considering whether a crime is heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
In drafting this factor, the legislature indicated its belief that many
crimes by their very nature are heinous, atrocious, or cruel" and, ab-
sent evidence of other aggravating and mitigating factors, merit the
presumptive sentence. This is evidenced by the use of the word "espe-
cially." It has been difficult for courts at all levels to decide which
crimes are "especially" heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
In the early case of State v. Ahearn ".. the court of appeals considered
whether two crimes, one involving a homicide, were specially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel. The defendant was convicted of voluntary man-
slaughter and felonious child abuse upon evidence that showed that
prior to his death the two-year-old victim had been hit at least three
times, had his skull crushed and a cast on his leg shattered, was tied to
a crib, and was put under a mattress. The court, in holding that the
defendant was not prejudiced by any incorrect findings of the trial
court, assumed that the lower court's finding that each crime was espe-
cially heinous, atrocious, or cruel was not supported by the evidence.
The court indicated that the defendant's crime of felonious child abuse,
evidenced by the hitting, tying up, and placing of the child under a
mattress was no more heinous, atrocious, or cruel than any other crime
of felonious child abuse." 12
106. See supra note 17.
107. Some courts find instead that all three adjectives are applicable, i.e., that the crime was
"especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel." Eg. State v. Ahearn, 59 N.C. App. 44, 45, 295 S.E.2d
621, 622 (1982), rev'd and remanded, 307 N.C. 584, 300 S.E.2d 589 (1983).
108. State v. Ahearn, 307 N.C. at 599, 300 S.E.2d at 698 ("Where factors are listed in the
disjunctive. . . trial judges are cautioned to eliminate those portions inapplicable to the particular
case").
109. See infra text accompanying notes 111-119.
110. See State v. Goodman, 298 N.C. 1, 24-25, 257 S.E.2d 569, 585 (1979) (holding that every
murder may be heinous, atrocious, or cruel, but that a finding that a murder is especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel must be based on evidence that the murder was more brutal than most). See
also State v. Medlin, 62 N.C. App., 251, 253, 302 S.E.2d 483, 485 (1983).
111. 59 N.C. App. 44, 49, 295 S.E.2d 621, 624 (1982).
112. Id. The court had trouble with the finding as to the crime of manslaughter because it
19
Anderson: A Second Look at the North Carolina Fair Sentencing Act
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1984
536 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
On appeal," 3 the supreme court was much clearer regarding the
question of the propriety of the trial court's findings. The court agreed
with the court of appeals that the crime of felonious child abuse was
not out of the ordinary. As to the crime of manslaughter, however, the
court applied the Pinch standard and concluded that the homicide was
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel because the victim had received
multiple wounds and because he lingered in pain before he died.'
After Ahearn, there was still no clear guidance for considering when
a crime, other than homicide, was especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel. Shortly after Ahearn the court of appeals again had the occasion
to consider the aggravating factor in two non-homicide cases.' 15 The
defendant in State v. Medlin shot his girfriend five times, wounding her
head, ear, neck, chest, and hand. The victim's face was partially para-
lyzed, and her hearing was impaired. She was unable to drive a car. In
State v. Massey the defendant was one of a group who went to the
victim's apartment with a sawed-off shotgun and a baseball bat to re-
cover money and drugs. In sentencing the defendant in Massey for
attempted burglary the trial court found that crime especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel based upon evidence that the defendant had
knocked in the victim's door at 11:30 p.m." 6 In both Medlin and Mas-
sey the appellate court relied on the Pinch standard in finding that the
crime was not more brutal than ordinary crimes of that type,' ' and in
the case of Massey, not "conscienceless, pitiless, or unnecessarily tortu-
ous conduct.""' 8 It is easy to see that Massey's crime of attempted bur-
glary was no more egregious than any other attempted burglary. In
light of the many injuries to Medlin's girlfriend, it is hard to see how
the assault with intent to kill inflicting serious injry was not more egre-
gious than the typical assault of that variety. The court implied that
injury as severe as that sustained by Medlin's victim is the natural con-
sequence of an assault with intent to kill. It seems that her injuries may
found that the same evidence had been used to find the especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel
factor as had been used to find that the victim was young. Id.
113. 307 N.C. 584, 300 S.E.2d 689 (1983).
114. Id. at 606-07, 300 S.E.2d at 703.
115. State v. Medlin, 62 N.C. App. 251, 302 S.E.2d 483 (1983) (assault with a deadly weapon
with intent to kill inflicting serious injury); State v. Massey, 62 N.C. App. 66, 302 S.E.2d 262,
modoiedandaf'd, 309 N.C. 625, 308 S.E.2d 332 (1983) (attempted burglary). After Ahearn and
before Medlin and Massey, the court of appeals considered the factor in two other cases; State v.
Sandlin, 61 N.C. App. 421, 300 S.E.2d 893, cert. denied, 308 N.C. 679, 304 S.E.2d 760 (1983)
(upholding the trial court's finding that a homicide by strangulation was especially heinous, atro-
cious, or cruel); State v. Hammonds, 61 N.C. App. 615, 301 S.E.2d 457 (1983) (finding error in the
trial court's finding of especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel crime based on evidence of use of a
deadly weapon when that evidence was used to prove an element of the crime).
116. 62 N.C. App. at 68, 302 S.E.2d at 264.
117. State v. Medlin, 62 N.C. App. at 254, 302 S.E.2d at 485; State v. Massey, 62 N.C. App. at
68, 302 S.E.2d at 264.
118. 62 N.C. App. at 68, 302 S.E.2d at 264.
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have been more severe than those of other victims of such assault. Per-
haps Medlin was a good case for splitting the adjectives. It would not
be difficult to find that Medlin's acts in shooting his girlfriend five times
were especially cruel since they were especially designed to inflict a
high degree of pain with utter indifference to the suffering of his vic-
tim." 9 The design could be found in the firing of five non-fatal shots.
On the other hand, the Medlin victim's injuries may have been no
more severe than those of other victims of the same crime. Assaults
with intent to kill often inflict serious injury short of death, injury
which is contemplated by the nature of the offense. Medlin's real intent
was not to be cruel to or cause pain to his victim; his intent was to kill
her.
Nevertheless, the supreme court, in State v. Blackwelder, '2 noted
that the multiple shots and multiple wounds in Medlin could form the
basis for a finding that the crime was especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel. Though dictum, this is some guidance as to a standard in non-
homicide cases. Blackwelder, however, was convicted of second degree
murder. The court amended the Pinch standard for non-capital crimes.
While it is instructive to turn to our capital cases for a definition of an
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel offense, we decline to measure
the facts of those capital cases against the facts of cases decided under
G.S. 15A-1340.4(a)(1)f. Rather the focus should be on whether the
facts of the case disclose excessive brutality, or physical pain, psycho-
logical suffering, or dehumanizing aspects not normally present in that
offense. 12'
In upholding the trial court's finding that the murder of the victim
was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, the court found both exces-
sive brutality by Blackwelder and an unusual degree of suffering by his
victim. Blackwelder shot his victim in the back and in the head, liter-
ally blowing out his brains. Evidence showed that the victim had been
shot first in the back, that the victim could have lived for hours after
that shot, and that there was blood on many parts of the mobile home
where the victim's body was found. The court emphasized that its find-
ing of excessive brutality was based on the extensive mutilation of the
victim's body as a result of the firing of a shotgun no more than an inch
from the victim's head.' 22 This was evidence not normally present in
119. See supra note 104.
120. 309 N.C. 410, 413 n.1, 306 S.E.2d 783, 786 n.1 (1983).
121. Id at 413-14, 306 S.E.2d at 786 (emphasis in original).
122. Id. at 415, 306 S.E.2d at 787. See also State v. Benbow, 309 N.C. 538, 308 S.E.2d 647
(1983) (approval of trial court's finding of the factor based on evidence that the victim was repeat-
edly struck on the head, that the orb of one of the victim's eyes was driven into his brain, and that
the victim lingered for over twelve hours). But see State v. Higson, 310 N.C. 418, 312 S.E.2d 437
(1984) (Blackwelder test not met when evidence showed only that victim was stabbed in the heart
and died the same day).
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second degree murder cases.
At least in the case of homicides, Blackwelder instructs trial courts
and litigators, when considering the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggra-
vating factor, to look for (1) excessive brutality (2) excessive physical
pain (3) excessive psychological suffering, or (4) especially dehumaniz-
ing aspects. All need not be present. Prosecutors may argue that the
presence of one of the criteria is enough. Defense counsel may point
out that the Blackwelder court found two of the four indicia. Trial
courts may want to bolster their findings of this factor by listing which
of the indicia they have found. It is easy to see that the indicia overlap
and that a court, if it finds one of the indicia, may find several.
The lesson of Blackwelder as it applies to crimes other than homi-
cides is that the crime must differ from the normal crime of that type in
order to be especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. 123 The court seemed
to indicate, in its note on Medlin, that multiple injuries and multiple
acts can justify a finding of an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel
crime.
C. For Hire or Pecuniary Gain
When it became effective, the Fair Sentencing Act contained an ag-
gravating factor that "the offense was committed for hire or pecuniary
gain."' 12' The Capital Sentencing Statute, effective in 1977, contains a
similar provision, that "[t]he capital felony was committed for pecuni-
ary gain."' 25 It should be noted that the Fair Sentencing Act, when it
became effective, allowed consideration in aggravation of evidence that
the defendant had been hired to commit the crime or that he did it for
pecuniary gain. On the other hand, the Capital Sentencing Statute
does not expressly allow consideration of evidence that the defendant
was hired to commit a capital felony but only that he committed it for
pecuniary gain. It is because of this difference that the courts' interpre-
tations of the pecuniary gain factor for capital sentencing purposes had
real significance with respect to the legislature's use of the same phrase-
ology in the Fair Sentencing Act.
At the time of the enactment of the Fair Sentencing Act, the supreme
court had established a clear definition of "for pecuniary gain" in capi-
tal cases. In State v. Oliver126 the trial court found the pecuniary gain
factor in each of four murders, two by each defendant. Defendant
Moore shot and killed a convenience store operator, Allen Watts. De-
123. See State v. Atkins, 66 N.C. App. 67, 71, 310 S.E.2d 629, 632 (1984) for a non-homicide
case in which the finding of the factor was approved.
124. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a)(I)c (1983) (emphasis added).
125. Id. § 15A-2000(e)(6).
126. 302 N.C. 28, 62, 274 S.E.2d 183, 204 (1981).
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fendant Oliver killed Dayton Hodge, a customer outside putting gas in
his truck. Moore stole money from the store's cash register at the time
of the murders. The court said:
The hope of pecuniary gain provided the impetus for the murder of
both Watts and Hodge. This hope and the murders were inextricably
intertwined. The murder of Hodge was apparently committed in an
effort to eliminate a witness to the robbery; and the murder of Watts, in
the hope that defendants could successfully escape, avoid prosecution,
and enjoy the fruits of their sordid endeavor. The evidence is such that
the jury could find that both murders were committed for the purpose
of permitting defendants to enjoy pecuniary gain.' 27
The appellate courts adopted the Oliver rationale and applied it to the
cases governed by the Fair Sentencing Act.' 28
The legislature amended the Act on March 15, 1983. Effective Octo-
ber 1, 1983, the pecuniary gain provision of the Fair Sentencing Act
was rewritten to read, "[t]he defendant was hired or paid to commit the
offense."' 2 9 The effect of the amendment is clear. It eliminates alto-
gether that prong of the prior provision relating only to "pecuniary
gain."
The supreme court was conscious of this amendment when it decided
State v. Abdullah 30 under the provisions of the Fair Sentencing Act.
In that case the defendant, sentenced for second degree murder, was
one of several men involved in the robbery of a convenience store
which resulted in the murder of a Charlotte police officer. Money was
taken from the store and from the store clerk and divided among the
participants in the crime. Relying on the intent of the legislature as
expressed in the amendment to the Act, even though not then effec-
tive, 13 1 the court held that the trial court had erred in finding that the
offense had been committed for pecuniary gain because the defendant
had been neither hired nor paid to kill the victim.'3 2 It is now clear
that under the Fair Sentencing Act a trial court may find the factor
only if there is evidence that the defendant was hired or paid to commit
127. Id The court rejected the argument that submission to the jury of the pecuniary gain
factor violated the mandate of State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86, 113, 257 S.E.2d 551, 567-68 (1979)
that the underlying felony of robbery cannot be submitted as evidence in aggravation in a felony
murder case. See supra note 103.
128. E.g., State v. Thobourne, 59 N.C. App. 584, 297 S.E.2d 774 (1982) (holding that the trial
court properly found that the offense of possession of forty-five pounds of marijuana with intent to
sell and deliver was committed for pecuniary gain). But see State v. Morris, 59 N.C. App. 157,
161-62, 296 S.E.2d 309, 313 (1982) ("if the pecuniary gain at issue in a case is inherent in the
offense, then that 'peCuniary gain' should not be considered an aggravating factor").
129. An Act to Clarify the Aggravating Factor Regarding Pecuniary Gain Under The Fair
Sentencing Act, Ch. 70, 1983 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 61.
130. 309 N.C. 63, 306 S.E.2d 100 (1983).
131. Abdullah was handed down on August 9, 1983, before the October 1, 1983 effective date
of the amendment.
132. 309 N.C. at 77, 306 S.E.2d at 108.
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the crime. 3
3
The legislative amendment is perplexing. It leaves intact the provi-
sion of the Capital Sentencing Act providing for the aggravating factor
of a crime committed for pecuniary gain, but takes it away in those
cases controlled by the provisions of the Fair Sentencing Act. The fac-
tor seems equally applicable in either setting, especially in light of the
Oliver interpretation. Even more puzzling, though, is the result that it
is now an express aggravating factor that a defendant has committed
the crime because he waspaid or hired to do it in a non-capital case but
not in a capital one. The question arises as to what the capital aggra-
vating factor means. It may have only the meaning given it in Oliver.
On the other hand, it may be interpreted to apply only when the de-
fendant has been hired or paid to commit the crime. Perhaps it is now
subject to both interpretations. 134
Presumably more non-capital crimes than capital crimes will be
committed for pecuniary gain within the meaning of Oliver. There are
simply more non-capital crimes which can be commited for pecuniary
gain. The factor rarely arises in capital cases, and usually then only
when the State is relying on an underlying felony such as robbery or
burglary to prove a felony murder. 35 Finally, under the Fair Sentenc-
ing Act a trial court may nonetheless find an aggravating factor of pe-
cuniary gain within the meaning of Oliver if that factor is reasonably
related to the purposes of sentencing. 3 6  Perhaps the legislature
amended the wrong act, intending instead to amend the Capital Sen-
tencing Act.
The legislature at best has created an ambiguity. For instance, a de-
fendant who was paid to murder and who is to be sentenced under the
Capital Sentencing Act may argue that the legislature knew how to say
that such a fact is an appropriate consideration for sentencing, but that
it failed to do so under the Capital Act. He need only point to the Fair
Sentencing Act provision to make a convincing argument that the ab-
sence of the "hired or paid" language in the capital act prevents the
133. See State v. Thompson, 309 N.C. at 422, 307 S.E.2d at 158; State v. Benbow, 309 N.C. at
544, 308 S.E.2d at 651.
134. Subparagraph e of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (1983), before the listing of aggravating
factors, begins by saying that "Aggravating circumstances which may be considered shall be lim-
ited to the following:" This provision is no doubt the Legislature's act of compliance with the
mandate of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) and its progeny that capital punishments be
based on clearly delineated objective factors. This statute, then, is clearly'different from the Fair
Sentencing Act, which allows consideration of sentencing factors other than those specifically
listed in the statute. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a) (1983). See infra note 140 for the text of
the provision.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 126-27.
136. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a) (1983). See infra note 140.
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trial court from considering in aggravation the fact that he was hired or
paid to murder.
D. Other Aggravating Factors
Of the statutory aggravating factors, appellate courts have approved
of trial courts' findings that the victim was very young or physically
infirm,' 3 7 but have disapproved of findings that the victim was very
old' 38 or that the offense involved an attempted taking of property of
great monetary value. 139  Trial courts are not limited to finding only
those aggravating factors specifically listed in the statute. They may
also find any other factor proved by a preponderance of the evidence
and reasonably related to the purposes of sentencing. 40 The purposes
of sentencing under the Act include retribution, restraint, rehabilita-
tion, and deterrence. 141 Not only must any non-statutory factor be rea-
sonably related to one of these purposes of sentencing, it must also
evidence character or conduct peculiar to the particular offender to be
sentenced. 142
Non-statutory aggravating factors which appellate courts have ap-
proved or have held are reasonably related to the purposes of sentenc-
ing include that the defendant presented perjured evidence; 43 that the
defendant was dangerous to others;'" that the defendant committed
the crime with premeditation and deliberation; 145 that the offense was
137. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a)(I)j (1983); State v. Ahearn, 307 N.C. at 603, 300 S.E.2d
at 701 (1983).
138. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a)(l)j (1983); State v. Gaynor, 61 N.C. App. at 131, 300
S.E.2d at 262.
139. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a)(l)m (1983); State v. Thompson, 309 N.C. at 422, 307
S.E.2d at 158.
140. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a) (1983) provides that a trial court judge "'may consider
any aggravating and mitigating factors that he finds are proved by the preponderance of the evi-
dence, and that are reasonably related to the purposes of sentencing, whether or not such aggra-
vating or mitigating factors are set forth herein, ... "
141. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.3 (1983) provides:
Itjhe primary purposes of sentencing a person convicted of a crime are to impose a punish-
ment commensurate with the injury the offense has caused, taking into account factors that
may diminish or increase the offender's culpability; to protect the public by restraining of-
fenders; to assist the offender toward rehabilitation and restoration to the community as a
lawful citizen; and to provide a general deterrent to criminal behavior.
See Cooke, supra note 3, at I-1 (noting the purpose of the Act was to move away from a great
emphasis on rehabilitation as a purpose of punishment toward a philosophy of retribution and
deterrence).
142. State v. Chatman, 308 N.C. 169, 180, 301 S.E.2d 71, 78 (1983); State v. Ahearn, 307 N.C.
584, 596, 300 S.E.2d 689, 696 (1983); State v. Medlin, 62 N.C. App. 251, 256, 302 S.E.2d 483, 486
(1983).
143. State v. Thompson, 310 N.C. 209, 311 S.E.2d 866 (1984). The supreme court has cau-
tioned trial judges to find this factor only in the most extreme cases of perjury. Id.
144. State v. Ahearn, 307 N.C. at 604, 300 S.E.2d at 702 (reasonably related to purpose of
protecting the public through restraint of offenders).
145. State v. Melton, 307 N.C. 370, 376, 298 S.E.2d 673, 678 (1983).
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planned; 4 6 that the defendant is a dangerous sex offender;' 47 that the
defendant committed repeated acts of fellatio and forced his finger or
penis into the victim's anus; 148 that each of two homicides was comitted
during a course of conduct in which the defendant committed an act of
violence against another person;'49 that the defendant was under a sus-
pended sentence at the time of the offense; 5 0 and that the defendant
used stolen property in committing his offense.' 5 ' Non-statutory fac-
tors which the appellate courts have determined are not reasonably re-
lated to the purposes of sentencing or have rejected for other reasons
include that the defendant was dangerous to himself;' 52 that the pre-
sumptive sentence "does not do justice;"'' 53 that the defendant did not
assist the arresting officer or District Attorney or aid in the apprehen-
sion of other felons; 5 4 that the defendant "associated with members of
a motorcycle gang who dealt in drugs;"' 155 that the victim suffered se-
vere physical disability; 56 that the sentence was necessary to deter
others;' 7 that a lesser sentence "would unduly depreciate the serious-
ness of the crime"; 58 and that the defendant served a prior prison
term.' 59 Trial courts should be reluctant to find non-statutory aggra-
vating factors. This is especially true in light of the discretion trial
courts have in assigning weight to the sentencing factors they have
found. 160
IV. SPECIFIC MITIGATING FACTORS
The controversies surrounding aggravating factors arise when de-
fendants complain that trial courts have found fators which they should
not have found. Controversies are not as numerous in situations where
146. State v. Chatman, 308 N.C. 169, 180, 301 S.E.2d 71, 77 (1983). See State v. Isom, 65 N.C.
App. 223, 230-31, 309 S.E.2d 283, 288 (1983) (planning not an essential element of burglary).
147. 308 N.C. at 180, 301 S.E.2d at 78.
148. State v. Abee, 308 N.C. 379, 381, 302 S.E.2d 230, 231 (1983).
149. State v. Taylor, 309 N.C. at 574, 308 S.E.2d at 305-06.
150. State v. Stinson, 65 N.C. App. 570, 309 S.E.2d 528 (1983).
151. State v. Farrow, 66 N.C. App. 147, 150, 310 S.E.2d 418, 420 (1984).
152. State v. Ahearn, 307 N.C. at 604, 300 S.E.2d at 702.
153. State v. Blackwelder, 309 N.C. at 418, 306 S.E.2d at 788-89. See also State v. Chatman,
308 N.C. 169, 301 S.E.2d 71 (1983).
154. State v. Thobourne, 59 N.C. App. 584, 297 S.E.2d 774 (1982) (potential infringement on
right to plead not guilty).
155. State v. Massey, 62 N.C. App. 66, 69, 302 S.E.2d 262, 264, modifted and af9d, 309 N.C.
625, 308 S.E.2d 332 (1983).
156. State v. Medlin, 62 N.C. App. 251, 256, 302 S.E.2d 483, 486 (1983).
157. State v. Chatman, 308 N.C. 169, 180, 301 S.E.2d 71, 78 (1983).
158. Id See also State v. Blackwelder, 309 N.C. 538, 306 S.E.2d 783 (1983) (presumptive
sentence does not do justification to the seriousness of the crime).
159. State v. Isom, 65 N.C. App. 223, 230, 309 S.E.2d 283, 287-88 (1983).
160. See infra text accompanying notes 215-18. See also State v. Higson, 310 N.C. 418, 312
S,E.2d 437 (1984) (trial court improperly found non-statutory aggravating factors).
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the trial courts have failed to find mitigating factors. Most, but not all,
trial courts readily find mitigating factors supported by the evidence.' 6
Some courts are obstinate 62 or reluctant16 when it comes to finding
mitigating factors. Controversies, though few, have arisen. They in-
volve the mitigating factors of voluntarily acknowledged wrongdo-
ing,'16  the defendant's good character or reputation in the
community,165 and others.
A. Voluntarily Acknowledged Wrongdoing
Proof of voluntarily acknowledged wrongdoing 166 is some evidence
that the defendant is on the road toward rehabilitation. 167  Clearly, the
defendant must acknowledge that he has done something wrong.
168
Nevertheless, the legislative language relating to this factor is subject to
differing interpretations. The acknowledgment of the wrongdoing
must be either before arrest or "at an early stage of the criminal pro-
cess." A time before arrest is easy to pinpoint, but reasonable men may
differ on where to draw the line beyond this point. The acknowledg-
ment must also be "voluntary," an ambiguous term. These problems of
interpretation evoked commentary even before the effective date of the
Act. 169
161. This willingness to find mitigating factors is the result produced by the appellate courts'
holdings that trial courts retain a good deal of discretion in sentencing under the Fair Sentencing
Act. See infra notes 216-21 and accompanying text.
162. Eg., State v. Graham, 61 N.C. App. 271, 274, 300 S.E.2d 716, 718 (1983) (trial court
either misconstrued the statute or failed to consider the mitigating factor in the face of the State's
own evidence clearly establishing the mitigating factor).
163. Eg., State v. Benbow, 309 N.C. 538, 308 S.E.2d 647 (1983) (trial court refused to find that
defendant could not reasonably foresee that his conduct would cause harm, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-1340.4(l)(2)j (1983), or that he was suffering from a mental condition which significantly
reduced his culpability for the crime, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a)(2)d (1983), when those
two mitigating factors were supported by substantial, unrebutted evidence; but the trial court was
upheld by the supreme court, 309 N.C. at 546, 308 S.E.2d at 652. See also State v. Teague, 60
N.C. App. 755, 300 S.E.2d 7 (1983) (trial court refused to consider that the defendant readily
submitted to arrest, that the defendant had trouble adapting to a non-prison society, that impris-
onment without treatment would not benefit the homosexual defendant, and that the defendant
would have a supportive family environment if not imprisoned).
164. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a)(2)l (1983).
165. Id. § 15A-1340.4(a)(2)m.
166. Id. § 15A-1340.4(a)(2)l provides for mitigation if "[pirior to arrest or at an early stage of
the criminal process, the defendant voluntarily acknowledged wrongdoing in connection with the
offense to a law enforcement officer."
167. One of the express purposes of sentencing under the Fair Sentencing Act is "to assist the
offender toward rehabilitation and restoration to the community as a lawful citizen." Id. § 15A-
1340.3.
168. State v. Simmons, 65 N.C. App. 804, 807, 310 S.E.2d 139, 141 (1984) (the defendant's
turning himself in alone not enough to establish the factor). A defendant may use the mitigating
factor that he admitted his crime even though he has raised an exculpatory defense. State v.
Puckett, 66 N.C. App. 600, 312 S.E.2d 207 (1984).
169. Snepp, supra note 79, at IV-10. Judge Snepp, a superior court judge, urged his fellow
trial judges to find the factor only when the defendant "made an inculpatory statement which was
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The supreme court dealt with the issue in one of its first decisions
involving the Act, State v. Ahearn."' The trial court found the factor
for both of the crimes for which the defendant was sentenced, felonious
child abuse and voluntary manslaughter. During police interrogation
the defendant admitted acts amounting to child abuse but not acts of
manslaughter. The court held a plea of guilty at trial was not evidence
upon which the factor could be established. More importantly, the
court stated that the policy behind the factor was to find mitigation in
the defendant having shown remorse for his acts. 171
From Ahearn, therefore, it appeared that although the time of trial is
too late a time for the acknowledgment of wrongdoing, during police
interrogation after arrest is not. The issue did not arise in Ahearn
whether the statement the defendant made during custodial interroga-
tion was voluntary-that is, whether it was made without police threats
or promises.17 2  Nor did the Ahearn facts involve pre-arrest spontane-
ous statements. 7 3 It appears possible that statements made by defend-
ants prior to arrest, even though they are voluntary, may not show
remorse so as to bring them within the statutory provision as inter-
preted in Ahearn. The Ahearn requirement of remorse may prevent a
trial court from finding that a spontaneous utterance is a factor in miti-
gation because it is not remorseful.
In State v. Graham 74 the defendant denied any wrongdoing prior to
not responsive to custodial interrogation." Id Judge Snepp was concerned that this mitigating
factor might cause defendants to waive Miranda rights and confess when they otherwise would
not. Judge Snepp ignored, however, the evil which Miranda was designed to prevent. A defend-
ant must be afforded his Miranda rights to prevent the defendant's making of statements as a
result of the inherently coercive nature of the custodial interrogation setting. 384 U.S. 436, 445-58
(1966). The legislature's encouragement of early acknowledgment of wrongdoing by way of the
statute no more adds to the coercive nature of the custodial setting than any other consideration
which might influence the defendant to make an inculpatory statement. Perhaps Judge Snepp's
concern is that police will use the mitigating factor as a means to persuade suspects to talk. Such a
police practice would no doubt affect the competency of statements thereby obtained, and district
attorneys should ensure that the police are aware of this potential problem area.
170. 307 N.C. at 607-08, 300 S.E.2d at 704. For a discussion of the facts of the case, see supra
text accompanying notes 111-14. The court of appeals had discussed the factor twice before
Ahearn. In State v. Massey, 59 N.C. App. at 707, 298 S.E.2d at 65-66, the court held that there
was no error in the trial court's refusal to find the factor when the defendant had failed to ask for
such a finding or object to the trial court's failure to make such a finding. In State v. Melton, 307
N.C. at 380, 298 S.E.2d at 680, the court approved the trial court's finding of the factor when the
evidence showed that the defendant returned the borrowed murder weapon and confessed to po-
lice immediately after killing his girfriend's new lover.
171. 307 N.C. at 607, 300 S.E.2d at 704.
172. State v. Fox, 274 N.C. 277, 292, 163 S.E.2d 492, 502 (1968) (holding incompetent as
evidence a confession of the defendant made after police told him that telling the truth would
make things better in court and reduce the charges).
173. State v. Harrelson, 265 N.C. 589, 590, 144 S.E.2d 650, 651 (1965) (per curiam opinion
holding that admissions were competent when the defendant blurted out inculpatory statements
over the telephone).
174. 61 N.C. App. 271, 300 S.E.2d 716 (1983).
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his arrest, but acknowledged his culpability immediately after he was
arrested. The timing of the acknowledgment would seem to be well
within the language "at an early stage of the criminal process." Yet,
court of appeals Chief Justice Vaughn dissented from such a holding
on the ground that "criminal process" began when the criminal investi-
gation began. 17  Notwithstanding Justice Vaughn's interpretation, the
statute's use of the disjunctive in saying "prior to arrest or an early
stage of the criminal process" is indicative of a legislative intent to
place an "early stage" of the criminal process after arrest. The supreme
court had no trouble with the timing of Graham's acknowledgment of
wrongdoing. For purposes of the mitigating factor, the court held that
the criminal process begins "upon either the issuance of a warrant or
information, or upon the return of a true bill of indictment or present-
ment, or upon arrest, whichever comes first."' 17 6
In Ahearn the supreme court read into the statute a requirement of
remorsefulness not made explicit by the legislature. The remorseful-
ness of the defendant should be a factor affecting the weight to be given
this factor, after a trial court has found it, in the balancing of aggravat-
ing and mitigating factors, especially in light of the discretion trial
courts have in assigning weight to factors. 17 7 Remorsefulness should
not be a consideration in the finding of the factor. The supreme court
so held in State v. Graham .178 Trial courts should find this factor when
the preponderance of the evidence has proven that the acknowledg-
ment was voluntarily made at the proper time. This should include
spontaneous statements made prior to arrest and acknowledgments
made in a custodial interrogation setting. '79 Evidence showing that the
acknowledgment was spontaneous or self-serving, though voluntary,
should affect the factor's weight in the balancing process and not pre-
vent the trial court from finding it.
B. Good Character or Reputation in the Community
A criminal defendant's character and reputation have long been con-
175. Id. at 274-75, 300 S.E.2d at 718-19. The majority had said:
For purposes of the statute, 'the criminal process' is not commenced until the defendant either
is arrested, is served with criminal process, waives indictment or is both indicted and has
actual notice of the fact of his indictment. We find support for this conclusion in G.S. 15A-
701 et seq., the Speedy Trial Act, and G.S. 15A-932 which allows pending proceedings to be
dismissed with leave when the defendant fails to appear and cannot be readily found.
Id at 274, 300 S.E.2d at 718.
176. State v. Graham, 309 N.C. at 589-90, 308 S.E.2d at 314.
177. See infra notes 207-218 and accompanying text.
178. 309 N.C. at 591, 308 S.E.2d at 315.
179. See State v. Chatman, 308 N.C. 169, 301 S.E.2d 71 (1983) wherein there was no challenge
to a finding of a voluntary acknowledgment of wrongdoing which was made during custodial
interrogation. Supra note 169.
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sidered relevant in his sentencing. 8 ' Trial courts want to know what
type of person they are sentencing. The Fair Sentencing Act allows a
trial court to consider the character and reputation of the defendant.'
This factor, like all others, is subject to the requirement that it be
proved by a preponderance of the evidence. 82 However, because char-
acter is a direct issue in this context, it may be proved not only by
evidence of reputation, but also by evidence of opinion and specific
acts.183 The trial court may reject evidence of those factors which it
does not find by a preponderance of the evidence.' 84 Technically this
means that in sentencing a trial court may not consider a defendant's
evidence of good character or reputation when it is probative but fails
to tip the scales by the greater weight.
The supreme court, in State v. Blackwelder,185 pointed out that it is
the quality and not the quantity of evidence which matters. A defend-
ant may put on the witness stand a large number of witnesses who will
testify as to traits of good character or reputation. However, if they do
not say enough good things about the defendant the trial court may not
consider any of the defendant's proffered evidence. In Blackwelder
many witnesses testified that the defendant paid his bills and was not
violent when drunk. The court found that this evidence was not of
sufficient quality to be considered in sentencing the defendant. ,86
In State v. Taylor'87 the evidence was more substantial. Four wit-
nesses testified that the defendant had a non-violent reputation. Yet
180. See cases cited in note 51 supra. One of W. Somerset Maugham's characters describes
well the difference between character, what a person really is, and reputation, what others say he is
by observing his actions:
It's my business to prevent crime and to catch the culprit when crime is committed, but I've
known far too many criminals to think that on the whole they're worse than anybody else. A
perfectly decent fellow may be driven by circumstances to commit a crime and if he's found
out he's punished; but he may very well remain a perfectly decent fellow. Of course society
punishes him if he breaks its laws, and it's quite right, but it's not always his actions that
indicate the essential man. If you'd been a policeman as long as I have, you'd know it's not
what people do that really matters, it's what they are. Luckily a policeman has nothing to do
with their thoughts, only with their deeds; if he had, it would be a very different, a much more
difficult matter.
W. MAUGHAM, Footprints in the Jungle, in 65 SHORT STORIES 639 (1976). The Fair Sentencing
Act, in allowing a trial court to consider a defendant's character, permits consideration of what
kind of person the defendant is and the more difficult matter of how he thinks.
181. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a)(2)m (1983) provides for the mitigating factor that "the
defendant has been a person of good character or has had a good reputation in the community in
which he lives."
182. Id. § 15A-1340.4(a).
183. State v. Taylor, 309 N.C. 570, 576, 308 S.E.2d 302, 307 (1983); State v. Benbow, 309 N.C.
538, 308 S.E.2d 647 (1983).
184. State v. Teague, 60 N.C. App. 755, 758, 300 S.E.2d 7, 9 (1983); State v. Davis, 58 N.C.
App. 330, 333, 293 S.E.2d 658, 661 (1982).
185. 309 N.C. 410, 306 S.E.2d 783 (1983).
186. Id
187. 309 N.C. 570, 308 S.E.2d 302 (1983).
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this was not sufficient evidence to show that the defendant had a good
reputation "in the community in which he lived," because the witnesses
knew Taylor only socially. The evidence was substantial, unrebutted,
and proven by a preponderance 8 that the defendant had a good repu-
tation as to a specific character trait of non-violence. The court held,
however, that the evidence was neither manifestly credible nor "over-
whelmingly persuasive." In reaching these conclusions the court relied
in part on the fact that all four witnesses were long-time or social
friends of the defendant.
The Taylor interpretation of the statute is strict. The court seems to
have increased the burden of persuasion for the defendant on this par-
ticular mitigating factor beyond a preponderance of the evidence to a
standard of overwhelming persuasiveness. At the same time, Taylor
now makes it more difficult for defendants to use as character or repu-
tation witnesses those people who know defendants best, their friends.
Finally, Taylor is especially onerous because it equates the good char-
acter of a defendant within the meaning of the Act's provision for a
mitigating factor to the quality of character required of an applicant for
the bar exam.1 89 Surely a criminal defendant, about to be sentenced
for a crime, should not be held to the same standard of character as he
who desires to embark upon a legal career.
Taylor had "a good reputation in the community" with respect to the
peculiar character trait of non-violence. Admittedly a non-violent rep-
utation is but one ingredient of Taylor's overall reputation. Yet, where
there is no evidence showing a bad overall reputation and evidence of
good reputation as to one trait, as in Taylor, trial courts ought to con-
sider the good reputation evidence in sentencing. The trial court may
afford the evidence the appropriate weight in the balancing process. 9 °
A different situation occurred in State v. Benbow. 19' There was sub-
stantial evidence of the defendant's good character and reputation in
the community. The trial court properly found as a factor in aggrava-
tion that the defendant had a prior conviction. At the same time the
trial court did not find in mitigation that the defendant had a good
character and a good reputation. The supreme court relied on the Tay-
188. The court said in State v. Jones, 309 N.C. 214, 218-19, 306 S.E.2d 451, 454 (1983) that
"when evidence in support of a particular mitigating or aggravating factor is uncontradicted, sub-
stantial, and there is no reason to doubt its credibility, to permit the sentencing judge simply to
ignore it would eviscerate the Fair Sentencing Act."
189. The court relied on language from In re Applicants for License, 191 N.C. 235, 238, 131
S.E. 661, 663 (1926), to the effect that good character "is something more than an absence of bad
character. . . . Such character expresses itself, not in negatives nor in following the line of least
resistance, but quite often in the will to do the unpleasant thing, if it is right, and the resolve not to
do the pleasant thing if it is wrong."
190. See infra text accompanying notes 216-21.
191. 309 N.C. 538, 308 S.E.2d 647 (1983).
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lor rationale and found that the trial court had not abused its discretion
in failing to find the mitigating factor.
The Benbow facts raise an interesting question. The evidence of the
defendant's good character and reputation in no way affected the find-
ing as to the defendant's prior conviction, but evidence of the prior
conviction probably prevented the trial court from finding that the de-
fendant's character and reputation were good. This appears as a form
of balancing prior to the finding of both aggravating and mitigating
factors. Under a proper application of the balancing process the trial
court should have found, without consideration of the prior convictions
which it found to be a factor in aggravation, that the defendant had a
good character and reputation, if it were proved by a preponderance of
the evidence. Only then should the trial court have weighed those two
factors, along with all other factors in aggravation and mitigation
proved by a preponderance of the evidence, in deciding whether to de-
viate from the presumptive sentence. The finding of factors in aggrava-
tion and mitigation should not involve the weighing of one factor
against another.
C. Mental Condition Reducing Culpability
Two of the mitigating factors deal with the mental condition or ca-
pacity of the individual defendant as it evidences the defendant's cul-
pability for the crime for which he is to be sentenced. The first
provides for mitigation if "the defendant was suffering from a mental
or physical condition that was insufficient to constitute a defense but
significantly reduced his culpability for the offense;"' 92 the second if
"the defendant's immaturity or his limited mental capacity at the time
of the commission of the offense significantly reduced his culpability
for the offense."' 93 A third related factor is that the defendant "could
not reasonably foresee his conduct would cause or threaten serious
bodily harm or fear."' 9 4 It is clear that the two factors involving the
state of the defendant's mind can not be established without an expert
opinion in the transcript or the record. '95 Defendants face considerable
difficulty, in any event, in establishing either factor.
Two opinions of the supreme court have produced inconsistent re-
sults. In State v. Taylor'96 expert evidence established that the defend-
ant suffered from chronic brain syndrome, and upon this evidence the
trial court found as a mitigating factor that the defendant suffered from
192. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a)(2)d (1983).
193. Id § 15A-1340.4(a)(2)e.
194. Id § 15A-1340.4(a)(2)j.
195. State v. Jones, 309 N.C. at 221, 306 S.E.2d at 456.
196. 309 N.C. 570, 308 S.E.2d 302 (1983).
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a mental condition which reduced his culpability but did not constitute
a defense. The supreme court upheld that finding. At the same time, it
upheld the trial court's decision not to find the factor that the defendant
had a limited mental capacity, based upon the same evidence. The
supreme court construed the latter factor as one involving "limited in-
telligence or low I.Q."' 9 7 In State v. Benbow 198 there was unrebutted
and manifestly credible expert testimony that the defendant "would be
unable, because of a borderline range of mental retardation and low
general intellectual function, to comprehend what consequences the ac-
tions of [others] would have on his life." Consideration of that testi-
mony leads to the conclusion that the defendant, who wielded no
deadly instrument, did not comprehend that the actions of his co-de-
fendants in killing the victim were also legally his actions. The court
determined that his ignorance alone was not evidence of a mental con-
dition sufficient to reduce his culpability.
It seems as though the defendant in Benbow asked the trial court to
find the wrong mitigating factor. In light of Taylor the defendant
should have been successful if he had asked the trial court to find the
factor of limited mental capacity based on the expert evidence of Ben-
bow's "borderline range of mental retardation and low general intellec-
tual function." Neither the trial court nor the supreme court applied
the statute to the evidence to produce the fair result. This is surprising
in light of the mandate of the Act that the trial court must consider each
of the Act's aggravating and mitigating factors.I9 9 Trial defense coun-
sel should note the necessity to ask the court for a finding of all the
mitigating factors supported by the evidence.
Even if defenders ask for all possible findings in mitigation sup-
ported by the evidence, both trial courts and appellate courts are reluc-
tant to find mitigating factors involving the defendant's mental state.
Even with the unrebutted expert testimony in Benbow, the trial court
refused to find that Benbow "could not reasonably foresee that his con-
duct would cause or threaten serious bodily harm or fear." It remained
uncontradicted that Benbow could not foresee what would happen.
The supreme court, however, held that Benbow's subjective beliefs
were not controlling, and that in spite of his mental state he could have
reasonably foreseen that his participation in an armed robbery could
produce harm, even though his role was only that of a lookout.2°°
197. Id
198. 309 N.C. 538, 545, 308 S.E.2d 647, 651 (1983).
199. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a) (1983); State v. Jones, 309 N.C. at 219, 306 S.E.2d at
454-55.
200. Benbow, 309 N.C. at 545-46, 308 S.E.2d at 652. Nor is it likely that a court will readily
find that a defendant "exercised caution" to avoid serious bodily injury. In State v. Jones, 309
N.C. 214, 306 S.E.2d 451 (1983), the defendant had tried to convince his co-defendant not to
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D. Other Mitigating Factors
The courts have construed mitigating factors dealing with: whether
the defendant "was a passive participant or played a minor role in the
commission of the offense;"2 ' whether the defendant "aided in the
apprehension of another felon or testified truthfully on behalf of the
prosecution in another prosecution of a felony;" ' whether the defend-
ant "acted under strong provocation, or the relationship between the
defendant and victim was otherwise extenuating; ' 2 3 and whether the
defendant "was suffering from a physical condition reducing his culpa-
bility.' ' 2° The legislature amended the Act, effective October 1, 1983,
to include honorable military service as a mitigating factor.205 A trial
court may also include as a consideration in mitigation any factor rea-
sonably related to the purposes of sentencing and proven by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. 2°  Appellate courts have not approved of non-
statutory mitigating factors found by trial courts. Non-statutory factors
of which they have disapproved include: that the defendant readily
submitted to arrest;20 7 that the defendant had trouble adapting to a
non-prison society;20 8 that imprisonment without treatment would not
benefit the homosexual defendant;209 and that the defendant would
have a supportive family environment if not imprisoned.210
commit an act of murder. Yet the supreme court upheld the trial court's refusal to find this miti-
gating factor because of the defendant's other participation in the crimes of larceny and robbery.
Id. at 221-22, 306 S.E.2d at 456.
201. State v. Benbow, 309 N.C. 538, 546, 308 S.E.2d 647, 652 (1983) (proper to consider during
sentencing the defendant's actual participation in the crime as opposed to his legal liability for the
acts of others); State v. Jones, 309 N.C. 214, 221,306 S.E.2d 451, 456 (1983) (trial court improperly
failed to find that the defendant played a passive role in a murder when the evidence, both uncon-
tradicted and manifestly credible, showed that the defendant urged the actual killer not to kill the
victim).
202. State v. Jones, 309 N.C. 214, 222, 306 S.E.2d 451, 456-57 (1983) (defendant who agreed to
testify against co-defendant as part of plea bargain could not avail himself of the mitigating factor
of having "testified truthfully" because at the time of his own sentencing hearing he had not yet
testified in the prosecution of another felony). Accord State v. Salters, 65 N.C. App. 31, 35, 308
S.E.2d 512, 515-16 (1983).
203. State v. Taylor, 309 N.C. 570, 579, 308 S.E.2d 302, 308 (1983) (factor of action under
strong provocation properly found as to defendant's wife but not proved as to defendant's sister-
in-law).
204. State v. Salters, 65 N.C. App. 31, 36, 308 S.E.2d 512, 516 (1983) (defendant must show a
link between his condition and his culpability).
205. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a)(2)o (1983).
206. Id § 15A-1340.4(a). See State v. Medlin, 62 N.C. App. 251, 302 S.E.2d 483 (1983); State
v. Melton, 307 N.C. 370, 298 S.E.2d 673 (1983). See supra note 141 for the statutory provision
setting out the purposes of sentencing.
207. State v. Teague, 60 N.C. App. 755, 758, 300 S.E.2d 7, 9 (1983).
208. Id
209. Id
210. Id
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V. WEIGHING OF AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS
In the absence of any aggravating or mitigating factors, a trial judge
must impose the legislatively-mandated presumptive sentence and need
not make any findings if he imposes the presumptive sentence.21' If the
trial court makes any findings of sentencing factors, he must balance
the aggravating factors against the mitigating factors.212 He need con-
sider only those factors found by a preponderance of the evidence.213
He may impose a sentence greater than the presumptive only if he finds
that the factors in aggravation outweigh those in mitigation. The Act
dictates that a trial judge may impose less than the presumptive sen-
tence only if he finds that the mitigating factors outweigh the aggravat-
ing factors.
Prior to the effective date of the Act, many trial judges thought they
would be stripped of much of the sentencing discretion they tradition-
ally held.214  Appellate courts have always been deferential to trial
courts' decisions regarding sentencing as long as trial judges remained
within the limits of sentencing set by statute.2 t5 This attitude of defer-
ence by appellate courts has not changed under the Fair Sentencing
Act.2 16 The court of appeals, in State v. Davis,21 7 its first case constru-
ing the Act, was quick to reassure trial judges that they retained discre-
tion in sentencing.
The fair sentencing act did not remove, nor did it intend to remove, all
discretion from the sentencing judge. Judges still have discretion to
increase or reduce sentences from the presumptive term upon findings
of aggravating or mitigating factors, the weighing of which is a matter
within their sound discretion. Thus, upon a finding by the preponder-
ance of the evidence that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating fac-
tors, the question of whether to increase the sentence above the
presumptive term, and if so, to what extent, remains within the trial
judge's discretion.
The discretionary task of weighing mitigating and aggravating fac-
tors is not a simple matter of mathematics. For example, three factors
211. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(b) (1983).
212. Id.
213. State v. Davis, 58 N.C. App. 330, 334, 293 S.E.2d 658, 661 (1982). A trial court need not
list specific mitigating factors found by a preponderance of the evidence if he finds that the aggra-
vating factors outweigh the mitigating factors. State v. Jones, 64 N.C. App. 505, 307 S.E.2d 823
(1983).
214. See Snepp, supra note 78, at IV-1. See also Comment, supra note 3, at 649-54, whose
author takes the position that the only real effect of the Act in limiting trial courts' discretion in
sentencing is psychological. Id at 652.
215. State v. Locklear, 294 N.C. 210, 213, 241 S.E.2d 65, 67 (1978); State v. Stansbury, 230
N.C. 589, 591, 55 S.E.2d 185 (1949).
216. Trial courts may still impose "consecutive terms for multiple offenses." State v. Isom, 65
N.C. App. 223, 227-28, 309 S.E.2d 283, 286 (1983).
217. 58 N.C. App. 330, 293 S.E.2d 658 (1982).
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of one kind do not automatically and of necessity outweigh one factor
of another kind. The number of factors found is only one considera-
tion in determining which factors outweigh others. Although the court
is required to consider all statutory factors to some degree, it may very
properly emphasize one factor more than another in a particular case.
N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-1340.4(a). The balance struck by the trial judge
will not be disturbed if there is support in the record for his
determination.21 8
The day after imposing sentence and during the session of court, the
trial judge in Davis struck one of the aggravating factors he found the
day before; however, he left intact the sentence, which was above the
presumptive. The trial court was held not to have abused its discretion.
The supreme court has consistently relied on the Davis rationale 2 9 and
language 220 whenever a question of the weighing of sentencing factors
has arisen. 22' Trial courts have been well-assured that they may exer-
cise discretion within certain bounds which will not be disturbed on
appeal. The appellate courts have not yet found that a trial court
abused its discretion under the Fair Sentencing Act.22 2
Trial courts, in the weighing of factors in aggravation and mitigation,
must assign a weight to each factor. Trial courts should welcome argu-
ments of counsel to aid them in this difficult task. Trial courts should
not be reluctant to find mitigating factors.2 23 They may find that the
aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors even though the
mitigating factors are greater in number. Similarly, trial judges may
find that mitigating factors outweigh aggravating factors even though
they are fewer in number. Trial defenders should insist that trial
judges find mitigating factors which are proved by a preponderance of
the evidence. 224  Trial advocates for, both the State and defendants
218. Id at 333-34, 293 S.E.2d at 661.
219. State v. Melton, 307 N.C. 370, 380, 298 S.E.2d 673, 680 (1983).
220. State v. Ahearn, 307 N.C. 584, 597, 300 S.E.2d 689, 697 (1983).
221. E.g., State v. Blackwelder, 309 N.C. 410, 306 S.E.2d 783 (1983); State v. Graham, 309
N.C. 587, 308 S.E.2d 311 (1983).
222. There have been some cases ripe for a finding that the trial court abused its discretion in
sentencing, e.g., State v. Benbow, 309 N.C. 538, 308 S.E.2d 647 (1983) (seventeen-year-old defend-
ant sentenced to life imprisonment for second degree murder, when presumptive sentence was
fifteen years, based upon evidence that he was a lookout for a robbery which resulted in the death
of the victim; remanded for resentencing not because of abuse of discretion but because the trial
court improperly found an aggravating factor); State v. Sandlin, 61 N.C. App. 421,300 S.E.2d 893,
disc. rev. denied, 308 N.C. 679, 304 S.E.2d 760 (1983) (imposition of a thirty-five year sentence,
twenty years over the presumptive of fifteen years, in a case of second degree murder where the
trial court found that the heinous, atrocious, or cruel act of killing by strangulation outweighed the
defendant's lack of a criminal record).
223. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text. Error is more likely in a trial court's
failure to find a mitigating factor than in its having found one not supported by the evidence.
224. Defendants who do not insist at trial upon a finding in mitigation may not be able to
complain upon appeal. See supra note 170.
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should vigorously argue, to the extent allowed, the weight to be attrib-
uted to each sentencing factor.
VI. APPELLATE RULES
A defendant convicted of a felony and punished with a sentence
above the presumptive has an appeal of right to the appellate courts.
225
He may question whether his sentence is supported by the evidence,
but evidence introduced both at trial and during a sentencing hearing
must be considered.226
The supreme court has formulated a clear rule when error is found in
a trial court's finding in aggravation and the trial court used that factor
to sentence the defendant above the presumptive. In early cases the
court of appeals usually affirmed the trial courts' sentences notwith-
standing error. 227 The court of appeals was little concerned with the
possibility that the trial judge might have imposed a lesser sentence if
he had to weigh the sentencing factors minus the aggravating factor or
factors which he improperly found. The supreme court, in State v.
Ahearn ,228 adopted a rule which contemplates that possibility and re-
quires remand to the trial judge, who is in the best position to fashion a
new sentence. "[I1n every case in which it is found that the judge erred
in a finding or findings in aggravation and imposed a sentence beyond
the presumptive term, the case must be remanded for a new sentencing
hearing. ' 22 9
This rule puts a greater onus upon the trial judge not to find an ag-
gravating factor either not supported by a preponderance of the evi-
dence or not reasonably related to the purposes of sentencing. 230 The
rule does not specifically apply to errors in mitigation findings. A trial
court could impose a sentence beyond the presumptive after failing to
find a mitigating factor which it should have found. Once again it is
the trial judge who is in the best position to know how the error af-
fected his sentencing decision. Such an error occurred in State v. Gra-
ham .23 The court of appeals in that case said "the balancing process
225. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1444(al) (1983); State v. Teague, 60 N.C. App. 755, 757, 300
S.E.2d 7, 8 (1983). All the appeals from judgments under the Fair Sentencing Act are to the court
of appeals, except those cases in which the defendant pleads not guilty and receives a sentence of
life imprisonment. In that instance, appeal lies directly to the North Carolina Supeme Court. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-27(a) & (b) (1981).
226. State v. Teague, 60 N.C. App. at 757, 300 S.E.2d at 8. The record on appeal must contain
specific references to pages of the transcript containing the evidence upon which the defendant
relies in assigning error. State v. Milam, 65 N.C. App. 788, 310 S.E.2d 141 (1984).
227. See chart located in State v. Ahearn, 307 N.C. at 601, 300 S.E.2d at 700.
228. Id at 602, 300 S.E.2d at 701.
229. Id See State v. Isom, 65 N.C. App. 223, 231-32, 309 S.E.2d 283, 288-89 (1983).
230. See supra notes 140-60 and accompanying text.
231. 61 N.C. App. 271, 300 S.E.2d 716 (1983).
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cannot be properly completed if the trial judge fails to consider a factor
listed in G.S. 15A-1340.4(a) which has been established by the evi-
dence, ' 232 and remanded the case for resentencing. It is clear, then,
that the Ahearn rule, though it speaks only in terms of errors made in
findings of aggravation, also applies to errors made in findings of
mitigation.
In early cases the appellate courts had difficulty deciding issues when
trial courts sentenced a defendant for more than one crime, but made
only one set of findings as to sentencing factors. The supreme court
then articulated a rule:
[Iln every case in which the sentencing judge is required to make find-
ings in aggravation and mitigation to support a sentence which varies
from the presumptive term, each offense, whether consolidated for
hearing or not, must be treated separately, and separately supported by
findings tailored to the individual offense and applicable only to that
offense.
2 33
Trial courts which follow the required procedure will not be faced with
a situation where an entire case is remanded for resentencing because
an appellate court was forced to find error in sentencing findings as
they related to all the crimes for which the defendant was sentenced. 34
VII. CONCLUSION
In the more than two years since the effective date of the Fair Sen-
tencing Act, many of the questions regarding its implementation have
been answered. The North Carolina appellate courts have dealt with
the major controversies under the Act. It is unlikely that there will be
many major future decisions in the North Carolina appellate courts
involving the Act. The courts' decisions have left a good deal of discre-
tion in the hands of trial courts, which will now decide the contests
under the Act's provisions.
RICHARD J. ANDERSON
232. Id at 274, 300 S.E.2d at 718.
233. State v. Ahearn, 307 N.C. at 598, 300 S.E.2d at 698.
234. See, e.g., State v. Farrow, 66 N.C. App. 147, 150-51, 310 S.E.2d 418, 420 (1984).
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